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INCENTIVE REGULATION, NEW




The electric utility sector is in the midst of paradigmatic change. Market
forces include decreased load growth, technological advances in distributed energy
resources, pressures for decarbonization, and demands for increased efficiency and
new utility services. Meanwhile, as the utility monopoly is undermined and prof-
its slow, financial analysts signal increasing risk to potential utility investors.
Suggestions for transforming the existing regulatory structure abound. At the
broadest level, such proposals reflect an established divide between energy policy,
which traditionally focuses on economics and markets, and environmental law,
which is based in the protection of natural resources and ecosystems. To marry the
two camps and reach the desired end goals of both industry and environmental
advocates, an integrated approach—merging economic, regulatory, and environ-
mental perspectives—must be taken. A key aspect of the analysis must be the
recognition that regulation creates incentives, and incentive-based regulation can
and should be used to further goals for the new utility system.
This Article: (1) identifies regulatory and economic incentives embedded in
the current utility system; (2) assesses current market trends and new utility
goals; and (3) analyzes the intersection of embedded regulatory incentives and
key proposals for regulatory changes in light of the new goals. It finds that propos-
als for regulatory change often fail to account for existing regulatory incentives,
and ignore opportunities to use regulatory incentives to modify and encourage
desired utility behavior. It concludes with recommendations for ways to incorpo-
rate incentive-based regulation in proposals for new utility regulatory structures.
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INTRODUCTION
“All regulation is incentive regulation.”1
Much has been written recently about the need for significant change
and evolution in the electric utility sector.2 On the industry side, analysts
1. This quote is generally attributed to former New York Public Service Commission
Chair Alfred Kahn. Gavin Purchas & Elizabeth B. Stein, Utility 2.0: New York Draws Lessons
on Utility Regulation from Across the Pond, ENVTL. DEF. FUND BLOG: ENERGY EXCHANGE (Dec. 8,
2014), http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2014/12/08/utility-2-0-new-york-draws-lessons-
on-utility-regulation-from-across-the-pond/.
2. See, e.g., Michael T. Burr, Reinventing the Grid: How to Find a Future that Works,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2014, at 21 (presenting a variety of viewpoints regarding the future of
the electric utility grid); Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean
a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2014) (discussing the impact of
distributed generation on electric utilities); James M. Van Nostrand, Getting to Utility 2.0:
Rebooting the Retail Electric Utility in the U.S., 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 149,
164–71 (2015) (analyzing proposals for new utility models in several states); ADVANCED EN-
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focus on the threat posed by distributed generation and slowing growth, as
well as the increasing need for capital investment in transmission and distri-
bution infrastructure and looming concerns about rising prices and cyber-
security.3 The environmental literature emphasizes the need for rapid de-
carbonization of the electric power system and development of distributed
generation in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address climate
change.4 Several state regulatory proceedings have outlined a new vision for
the future of utility regulation in light of changing market conditions and
new environmental pressures.5
ERGY ECON. INST. (AEEI), TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY ELECTRICITY SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA: A JOINT
UTILITY AND ADVANCED ENERGY INDUSTRY WORKING GROUP POSITION PAPER 12–13 (2015) (work-
ing paper), http://info.aee.net/hubfs/PDF/aeei-toward-21ces-ca.pdf?t=1439494418628 (pro-
posing long-term changes to California’s utility system).
3. See, e.g., EDISON ELEC. INST., ACTUAL AND PLANNED TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT BY INVES-
TOR-OWNED UTILITIES (2009–2018), at 1–2 (2015), http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/trans-
mission/documents/bar_transmission_investment.pdf (projecting approximately $65 billion
in transmission investment from 2015–2017); ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE INTEGRATED
GRID: REALIZING THE FULL VALUE OF CENTRAL AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 32–33 (2014),
http://tdworld.com/site-files/tdworld.com/files/uploads/2014/02/integratedgridepri.pdf
(describing need for grid modernization to accommodate distributed resources); Greg
Bolino, Business Model Mashup: Three “Power Plays” for Utilities Seeking Growth, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Sept. 2015, at 16 (describing “major threats” to the typical utility business model,
including reduction in demand, competition from distributed generation, changing policy
goals and changing customer demands); Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to
Rethink the Electric Business Model, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 65, 66–67 (2012) (discussing market fac-
tors and new customer demands undermining the traditional electric utility business model).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to
Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011) (arguing that innovation
and technological advances to propel clean energy are essential to achieving emissions reduc-
tion targets); William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614,
1620 (2014) (arguing that “a broader notion of public utility offers a possible normative and
conceptual frame . . . that will be necessary to realize a low-carbon future”); Howard A.
Latin, Climate Change Mitigation and Decarbonization, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8–10 (2014)
(describing the need for decarbonization, which is defined as a process of replacing green-
house gas- (GHG) emitting technology with GHG-free technology); Felix Mormann, Re-
quirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 911–12 (2011) (describing the
need for large-scale deployment of renewable resources for the generation of electricity).
5. See generally Investigation by the Department of Public Utilities on Its Own Mo-
tion into Modernization of the Electric Grid, Order No. 12-76-B, at 2 (Mass. Dep’t of Pub.
Utils. June 12, 2014) [hereinafter Investigation of Grid Modernization], http://
www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dpu/orders/dpu-12-76-b-order-6-12-2014.pdf (official investigation
focusing on grid modernization); E21 INITIATIVE, PHASE 1 REPORT: CHARTING A PATH TO A 21ST
CENTURY ENERGY SYSTEM IN MINNESOTA 5 (2014), http://www.betterenergy.org/projects/e21-
initiative (unofficial initiative including industry, consumer, environmental, academic, and
government representatives); ENERGY FUTURE COAL., UTILITY 2.0: PILOTING THE FUTURE FOR MA-
RYLAND’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND THEIR CUSTOMERS (2013), http://cleanenergytransmission.org/
uploads/Utility%202-0%20Pilot%20Project-reduced.pdf (Governor-sponsored coalition to
examine grid resiliency and the future of the utility system); AEEI, supra note 2; N.Y. State R
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Suggestions for changes to the existing regulatory structure abound.
When imagining the “utility of the future” or “Utility 2.0,” industry analysts
often propose shifting the value proposition of the utility away from com-
modity sales to the provision of utility services.6 On the environmental
side, scholars advocate for a transition to renewable resources, feed-in tar-
iffs, increased reliance on microgrids, and the development of the smart
grid.7 Proponents of energy efficiency have written about the need for regu-
latory tools to reduce utility disincentives to engage in efficiency projects
and reduce customer demand.8 Proponents of solar power argue in favor of
net metering and low fixed charges to create incentives for customers to
invest in distributed generation and energy efficiency.9
At the broadest level, the proposed reforms reflect an established divide
between energy policy, which traditionally focuses on economics and mar-
kets, and environmental law, which is based in the protection of natural
resources and ecosystems.10 Where energy policy historically sought to en-
Dep’t of Pub. Serv., About the Initiative, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, http://
www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA007DCFE2?Open
Document (last visited Apr. 2, 2016) (describing the “Reforming the Energy Vision” (REV)
proceeding initiated by New York’s Public Service Commission and providing links to rele-
vant documents).
6. See infra Subsection IV.B.2 and accompanying notes.
7. See PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE
FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 34–38 (2010) (describing the smart grid and its potential benefit
to the utility system); JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 168–70 (2011) (describing obligations for an imagined utility of the future, including
feed-in tariffs and renewable resource portfolios); Nicholas Abi-Samra, Toward a 21st Century
Grid: Producing Value with Advanced Distribution Management Systems, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar.
2014, at 44 (describing value of advanced distribution management systems); Michael Dorsi,
Clean Energy Pricing and Federalism: Legal Obstacles and Options for Feed-in Tariffs, 35 ENVI-
RONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 173, 183–85 (2012) (describing municipal and state feed-in tariff
programs); Joseph Wiedman & Tom Beach, Distributed Generation Policy: Encouraging Genera-
tion on Both Sides of the Meter, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 88, 91–92 (2013) (describing the use of feed-in
tariffs to encourage distributed generation); Kari Twaite, Note, Monopoly Money: Reaping the
Economic and Environmental Benefits of Microgrids in Exclusive Utility Service Territories, 34 VT.
L. REV. 975, 995–96 (2010) (offering a common statutory scheme for the implementation of
microgrids in utility service territories).
8. See, e.g., STEVEN NADEL & GARRETT HERNDON, AM . COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT
ECON., THE FUTURE OF THE UTILITY INDUSTRY AND THE ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 24–33 (2014),
http://aceee.org/research-report/u1404 (presenting variety of options for energy efficiency in
future utility models); SETH NOWAK ET AL., AM . COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., BE-
YOND CARROTS FOR UTILITIES: A NATIONAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES FOR ENERGY EFFI-
CIENCY 2–5 (2015), http://aceee.org/beyond-carrots-utilities-national-review (describing
utility disincentives for energy efficiency and options for addressing those disincentives).
9. See infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
10. Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 475–76 (2010) (describing differences in the initial intent behind energy
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sure an adequate supply of low-cost energy in order to further economic
growth, environmental policy sought to resolve market failures and to pro-
tect public goods from overuse or damage.11
This energy-environment divide is readily evident in discussions of the
future of utility regulation. Environmental advocates exhort utilities to
change, accusing them of dragging their feet and being unwilling to evolve
their business to meet the times, or even suggesting that utilities are delib-
erately slowing the pace of a transition to a clean economy.12 These propos-
als may contain a vision for the future, but often fail to identify the existing
regulatory and economic incentives that propel utility behavior. Utility ana-
lysts and regulators propose changes in ratemaking and the utility business
model to ensure utility financial stability and competitive advantage, but
offer little in the way of a long-term vision for addressing climate change
and decarbonization of the energy sector.13 Their efforts to ensure financial
and environmental law); Douglas N. Jones & Richard A. Tybout, Environmental Regulation
and Electric Utility Regulation: Compatibility and Conflict, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 31,
31–32, 35 (1986) (contrasting the purpose of environmental laws and the economic regula-
tion of utilities).
11. See Davies, supra note 10, at 475–76.
12. In a 2014 op-ed to the Salt Lake Tribune, the founders of Utah Citizens Advocat-
ing Renewable Energy accuse electric utility Rocky Mountain Power of being “stuck in a
coal-centric mentality and actively discouraging private consumer investment in renewable
energy.” Michael Rossetti & Melanie Florence, Op-Ed., Rocky Mountain Power Stuck in Coal-
Centric Mentality, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Apr. 5, 2014, 1:01 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/
opinion/57766018-82/energy-rmp-solar-coal.html.csp. Josh Voorhees suggests that the fight
to increase monthly fixed charges to solar PV customers is an attempt by utilities to “snuff
out residential rooftop solar and other renewable alternatives before they reach critical mass.”
Josh Voorhees, We’re Watching You, Wisconsin Public Service Commission, SLATE (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/09/alec_climate_change_a_fight_
over_rooftop_solar_panels_could_decide_america.html. As Joseph Tomain writes, “[t]he
country is making a revolutionary transition to a clean energy economy . . . . Quite simply,
electric utilities should behave as key actors in that transition. Today, however, utility efforts
have been lacking as they seek solace in old ways of doing business.” Joseph P. Tomain,
Traditionally-Structured Electric Utilities in a Distributed Generation World, 38 NOVA L. REV.
473, 475–76 (2014) (urging utilities to invest in new technologies and adopt new business
models to address changing market conditions).
13. Joseph Wiedman and Tom Beach, for example, offer a compelling list of possible
policy options to support distributed generation, such as net metering, feed-in tariffs, and
value of solar tariffs. See Wiedman & Beach, supra note 7, at 90–92. However, as the authors R
point out, it is impossible to make specific policy recommendations as to how these measures
can or should be implemented when certain outcomes—like cross-subsidization among cus-
tomer classes—require policy trade-offs and prioritization of conflicting social aims. Id. at 93.
In another example, when a collection of utility leaders were asked for their vision of the
utility system of 2050, none mentioned climate change, a high level of renewable resources,
or a decarbonized system. See Burr, supra note 2, at 22–23. R
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stability and consistent returns to investors without considering the long-
term risks of carbon pollution strike many as painfully short-sighted.
Adapting a regulatory system is a bit like turning an ocean liner: change
is more likely to come in increments than in a single, monumental thrust.
Furthermore, it makes little sense to begin turning the ship before the desti-
nation has been identified. Proposing ways to change the utility business
model before determining long-term goals and priorities for the system
leaves one with a variety of options and no means for deciding between
them. At the same time, without an understanding of the current regulatory
structure and the economic incentives it creates, efforts to enact change will
be delayed (at best) or roadblocked (at worst).
To marry the two camps and reach the desired end-goals of both indus-
try and environmental advocates, an integrated approach, merging eco-
nomic, regulatory, and environmental perspectives, must be taken. A key
aspect of the analysis must be the recognition that regulation creates incen-
tives, and incentive-based regulation14 can and should be used to further the
regulatory goals.
Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is threefold: (1) to identify
regulatory and economic incentives embedded in the current utility system;
(2) to assess current market trends and new goals for the utility system; and
(3) to analyze the intersection of embedded regulatory incentives and key
proposals for regulatory changes in order to determine whether the embed-
ded incentives will accelerate or create an obstacle to the achievement of the
new utility goals.
Part I begins with a historical view of the evolution of the utility sys-
tem, including the development of the regulatory compact, the regulation of
utility rates, and constitutional limits on rate regulation. Part I concludes
with an explanation of the goals of the early utility system, the manner in
which the regulatory structure supported those goals, and identification of
the regulatory incentives embedded in the current system. Part II considers
current market trends, including the changing nature of electric demand
growth, the distributed energy revolution, and the need for decarbonization
and modernization of generation and distribution systems.
Based on this analysis, Part III identifies current goals for the regulated
utility sector and identifies areas of conflict between these objectives and
embedded incentives. Part IV analyzes alternative regulatory structures that
have been proposed in the environmental, legal, and industry literature to
14. See SANFORD V. BERG, PUB. UTIL. RES. CTR., INTRODUCTIONS TO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
INCENTIVE REGULATION (2000), http://publicsde.regie-energie.qc.ca/projets/190/DocPrj/R-3842
-2013-C-OC-0010-Audi-Argu-2013_09_13.pdf (providing an overview of basic theories of
incentive regulation).
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meet the new utility goals, then asks how these proposals conflict with or
use regulatory incentives. Part V discusses the need for prioritization of
conflicting objectives. Part VI concludes with recommendations for using
incentive-based regulation to achieve the new goals for the utility sector.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UTILITY REGULATORY SYSTEM:
GOALS AND REGULATION IN ALIGNMENT
The early development of the utility regulatory system was marked by a
close alignment of regulatory goals and the structures and incentives de-
signed to achieve those goals. This part describes the development of the
utility regulatory structure, provides a brief overview of utility ratemaking
and the economic incentives it creates, and discusses how early regulatory
goals and incentives were aligned.
A. Establishment of Regulation
Though today we tend to think of electricity solely in terms of monop-
oly service, the system did not start out that way. In fact, the early years of
the electric industry were fiercely competitive.15 Cities and states granted
utility charters and franchises, but they were not necessarily exclusive.16
Competing providers strung wires haphazardly across cities without restric-
tion and with seemingly little regard for safety or public welfare.17
As the market evolved, it became apparent that expansion of the electric
system would require significant amounts of capital and could enjoy signifi-
cant economies of scale.18 Many began to argue that electric utilities were
natural monopolies, and competitive market forces could actually result in
higher, not lower, prices for customers.19 To expand the electric power sys-
15. See William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins
of State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1054–56
(2002) (describing early history of the electric system).
16. Denver, for example, granted an electric utility franchise “to all comers.” CHARLES F.
PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 127 (1988).
17. See ERNEST FREEBERG, THE AGE OF EDISON 80–84 (2013). “For late-nineteenth-cen-
tury city dwellers, the sky overhead became increasingly ominous, thick with wires that
might pour down a man-made lightning bolt without warning . . . . Every week the papers
ran stories of this very modern form of sudden death.” Id. at 81.
18. See LEONARD S. HYMAN, AMERICA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
67–68 (1985) (describing the early development of the system as being plagued by high fixed
costs and a need to increase usage and grow plants to build economies of scale); PHILLIPS,
supra note 16, at 71 (“For electric power generation . . . the economic justification for regula-
tion was based on the existence of significant economies of scale.”).
19. See HYMAN, supra note 18, at 4 (defining natural monopoly and applying the term R
to electric utilities); James K. Hall, Regulation of Public Utilities, 206 ANNALS AM . ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 92, 93–94 (1939) (describing monopolistic features of public utilities, including
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tem and keep prices low, utility providers needed investors with deep pock-
ets who wouldn’t demand excessive returns, a difficult task in the early,
chaotic days of the electric industry.20 Along with regulators and politicians,
many electric companies began to call for regulation in order to reduce the
risks associated with investment in the electric power system.21 In 1907,
inspired in part by industry recommendations,22 New York and Wisconsin
passed landmark legislation, quickly replicated across the nation, giving util-
ities regulated monopolies in return for state regulatory commissions having
control over electric rates and terms of service.23
In the end, the goals of regulation that emerged in the early twentieth
century were trifold: reasonable rates, adequate service, and utilities’ finan-
cial stability.24 The regulatory incentive mechanism chosen to achieve those
goals was cost-of-service regulation.25
economies of scale); Hausman & Neufeld, supra note 15, at 1052 (“Electric power generation, R
transmission, and distribution have always been highly capital-intensive endeavors . . . . In
the earliest days of the industry, the problem of raising capital was critical for success.”); cf.
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 10–13 (photo. reprint 2005) (1961)
(suggesting flaws in the presumption that utilities constitute a natural monopoly).
20. See HYMAN, supra note 18, at 67–68; Hausman & Neufeld, supra note 15, at 1052. R
21. See HYMAN, supra note 18, at 72–73 (“In other words, the utility management may R
have sought regulation to maintain profitability.”); Hausman & Neufeld, supra note 15, at R
1051. Industry father Samuel Insull campaigned heavily for regulation. See RICHARD MUNSON,
FROM EDISON TO ENRON: THE BUSINESS OF POWER AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF ELEC-
TRICITY 55 (2005).
22. See Hausman & Neufeld, supra note 15, at 1058–59 (noting the influence of a semi- R
nal report by the National Civic Federation, co-authored by Samuel Insull and other industry
representatives).
23. See WILLIAM E. MOSHER & FINLA G. CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 10, 22–25
(1933) (describing passage of laws in New York and Wisconsin and goal of regulated monop-
olies); PHILIPS, supra note 16, at 132–33 (describing history of passage of laws for utility
regulation); William L. Crow, Legislative Control of Public Utilities in Wisconsin, 18 MARQ. L.
REV. 80, 81 (1934) (suggesting that the passage of the 1907 Public Utility Law in Wisconsin
illustrated “a legislative decision that . . . the theory of public utility competition was wrong
and that regulated monopoly was right”).
24. See JOHN BAUER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 12 (1925) (“The principal
purposes of regulation as expressed or implied in public utility laws are three-fold: (1) rea-
sonable rates; (2) proper service; and (3) financial stability.”); HYMAN, supra note 18, at 133 R
(“Regulators must assure that the customer receives reliable service[;] . . . fairly apportion
the costs of service so that no group of customers is charged unduly[; and] set the overall
level of revenues at a point where the utility can earn a return similar to that earned in
competitive industries.”).
25. For more on cost of service regulation see Timothy J. Brennan, Is Cost-of-Service
Regulation Worth the Cost?, 3 INT ’L J. ECON. BUS. 25, 25 (1996) (describing cost of service as
the “traditional method of regulating public utilities in the United States”) and Maria Kop-
sakangas-Savolainen & Rauli Svento, Comparing Welfare Effects of Different Regulation Schemes:
An Application to the Electricity Distribution Industry, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 7370, 7370, 7371, 7377
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B. Regulatory Compact and Cost-of-Service Regulation
The bargain that was struck between the state and utilities regarding
regulation has been referred to as the “regulatory compact.”26 This concept
was summarized in a 1937 opinion by the Minnesota District Court:
The determination by the corporation to engage in the industry
affected with a public interest is of course voluntary on its part.
But, having engaged in such industry, the corporation is obligated
to service all persons who apply for service without partiality or
discrimination . . . , to render reasonably adequate service, to em-
ploy reasonably adequate facilities and to charge fair and reasonable
rates. In return, the utility . . . is generally protected against unfair
or unreasonable competition . . . and it is practically assured a fair
return upon the fair value of its property used in the public service
[among other benefits].27
The minimum constitutional standard for the “fair return” utilities were
entitled to earn was established in Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co.
v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia,28 where the Supreme Court
held,
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property which it employs for the conve-
nience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same
time and in the same general part of the country on investments in
other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding
risks and uncertainties.29
In Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas,30 the Court expanded
on this definition of a fair and reasonable rate-setting process:
(2010) (describing basics of cost-of-service regulation and setting forth advantages and disad-
vantages, and concluding that cost-of-service regulation is best at reducing costs).
26. See PHILLIPS, supra note 16, at 21 (1988) (describing the “long-standing (but unwrit-
ten) ‘regulatory compact’ as having two parts: an obligation of the utility to serve all comers,
and the assurance to the utility of an opportunity to earn a reasonable return on invested
capital”); Hall, supra note 19, at 92–93 (describing the responsibilities and special privileges
afforded public utilities as “offsetting compensation”).
27. Minnesota v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph, No. 221210 (D. Minn. 1937), ex-
cerpted in LEADING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 96–97 (Floyd R.
Simpson & Emerson P. Schmidt eds., 1940) (citations omitted).
28. Bluefield Waterworks & Improvements Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262
U.S. 679, 690 (1923).
29. Id. at 692.
30. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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The rate-making process . . . involves a balancing of the investor
and the consumer interests . . . . [T]he return to the equity owner
. . . should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integ-
rity of the enterprise, so as to maintain credit and attract capital.31
Thus, the constitutional standard explicitly requires a balancing of the
interests of consumers and investors; one way to judge the constitutional
validity of a regulatory scheme is to consider the impact it has on the mar-
ket for utility securities, or the returns obtained by utility investors.
Although states are not uniform in their methods of determining utility
rates, the majority of public utility commissions utilize cost-of-service, or
“rate-of-return” ratemaking.32 Under this system, the regulatory commission
sets rates at a level to cover annual operating expenses and afford the utility
a “reasonable” rate of return on its invested capital (“rate base”).33 Rate base
is calculated based on utility investments deemed “prudent” by utility
regulators.34
The regulated monopoly and cost-of-service ratemaking are elegantly
designed to provide security and confidence to utilities and their investors.
31. Id. at 603. Justice Holmes likened this balancing of the needs of investors and
customers to
steer[ing] between Scylla and Charybidis. On one side, if the franchise is taken to
mean that the most profitable return that could be got, free of competition, is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the power to regulate is null. On
the other hand, if the power to regulate withdraws the protection of the Amend-
ment all together, then the property is naught.
Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655, 669–70 (1912). He goes on to refer-
ence the regulatory compact when he states that this balancing is not “a matter of economic
theory, but of fair interpretation of a bargain.” Id. at 670.
32. A thorough discussion of cost-of-service ratemaking is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a general discussion of the process of rate setting, see HYMAN, supra note 18, at R
135–91 and PHILLIPS, supra note 16, at 174–80, 243–443.
33. See P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd. of P.R., 665 F.3d 309, 316 (1st
Cir. 2011) (describing the evolution of cost-of-service ratemaking); PHILLIPS, supra note 16, at
315, 375–76. “The constant underlying those standards was the idea that calculating the util-
ity’s cost ‘and then allowing a fair rate of return on it was a sensible way to identify a range
of rates that would be just and reasonable to investors and ratepayers.’” P.R. Tel. Co., 665
F.3d at 316.
34. Utility prudence is generally understood to mean that utility actions were reasona-
ble given the information available to the company at the time the decision was made. See
Gulf States Utils. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 689 So. 2d 1337, 1346 (La. 1997) (“[T]he
proper standard for determining whether a utility was imprudent is whether objectively that
utility acted reasonably under the circumstances.”); Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v.
Dept. of Pub. Utils., 956 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Mass. 1997) (“When conducting a prudence
review, the Department of Public Utilities determines whether a utility’s actions, based on
all that it knew or should have known at the time, were reasonable and prudent in light of
the circumstances which then existed.”); PHILLIPS, supra note 16, at 340–41.
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Although utility profits are not guaranteed, these regulatory structures
eliminate two of the key risks to investors: competition and the recovery of
invested capital.35 Cost-of-service ratemaking also fosters another goal of
the early utility system: growth.36 Because utility profits are based on capi-
tal investment, the system directly rewards utilities for investing in and
building out their systems. Indeed, the incentives produced by cost-based
regulation are so strong they may encourage over-investment or inefficient
investment.37
Thanks to expanding economies of scale and deliberate efforts by Sa-
muel Insull and others to increase consumer usage and the overall load fac-
tor of electric demand,38 this system also fostered a positive cycle of lower
costs and declining rates.39 “[T]he price for electricity . . . fell steadily from
1882 to 1969,”40 while access to electricity grew rapidly.41 Today, the United
States has one of the most reliable, lowest-priced systems in the world, and
35. Because utility rates are set on a prospective basis, and actual costs and expenses
will vary, the utility has an opportunity to earn the rate of return set in the rate case, rather
than a guaranteed return. See JONATHAN A. LESSER & LEONARDO R. GIACCHINO, FUNDAMENTALS
OF ENERGY REGULATION 45 (2d ed. 2013). “[P]rivate companies receive no guaranty of their
ability to enjoy a ‘fair rate of return,’ with the result that they may be under more or less
severe pressure to practice operating economies and to stimulate growth of demand for ser-
vice in order to earn the officially sanctioned rate.” BONBRIGHT, supra note 19, at 53. R
36. James Bonbright, in his seminal work on public utility rates, notes that “one of the
most prominent and most widely recognized functions of public utility rates” was to attract
capital and motivate production. BONBRIGHT, supra note 19, at 49. John Bauer emphasizes that R
the extension of service, and the requirement that utilities serve all customers (“must take
the ‘lean with the fat’”), were essential objects of early regulation. BAUER, supra note 24, at R
12, 14–15, 17–19.
37. The tendency to over-invest is known as the “Averch-Johnson effect,” after the
widely cited article that described this behavior of rate-regulated entities. See Harvey Averch
& Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM . ECON. REV.
1052 (1962). The regulatory practice of disallowing imprudent investments may also en-
courage overinvestment by utilities in order to compensate for unrecoverable investments.
Stratford Douglas et al., Disallowances and Overcapitalization in the U.S. Electric Utility Indus-
try, 91 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 23, 24 (2009).
38. See MUNSON, supra note 21, at 45–46 (describing Insull’s efforts to increase load R
factor and efficiency by interconnecting and shifting load between plants and generators, and
marketing special rates to banks and businesses). Load factor is a measure of efficiency that
represents the ratio of the total amount of energy used over a given period divided by the
total energy that could have been used.
39. See Charles G. Stalon & Reinier H. J. H. Lock, State-Federal Relations in the Eco-
nomic Regulation of Energy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 427, 445–46 (1990) (detailing growth in produc-
tivity of the utility sector and accompanying declining costs and increasing economies of
scale from the 1930s to the 1960s).
40. See HYMAN, supra note 18, at 117. R
41. See id. at 75–76, 91–92.
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the population enjoys near universal access.42 However, this structure also
created embedded incentives that continue to plague the system today: the
incentive to grow (even when it is not efficient), and a reliance on the
regulated monopoly to protect the industry from competition and provide
investors with the opportunity to earn a fair return.
II. INDUSTRY DISRUPTION: ANALYSIS OF MARKET TRENDS
The early days of utility regulation married the goals of reasonable
rates, financial security, and adequate service with a regulatory system that
seemed to provide all of those things.43 However, the alignment of goals
and regulatory structures that characterized the early utility system did not
last forever. In 1970, abrupt changes in the market led to falling demand
and rising prices.44 New environmental concerns thrust heretofore unfamil-
iar policy goals on the utility industry.45 In the decades that followed, the
utility industry was characterized by change: creation of long-term planning
schemes to ensure prudent investment;46 deregulation followed by re-regu-
42. See JOHN G. KASSAKIAN ET AL., MASS. INST. TECH. (MIT), THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC
GRID 236 (2011), http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/the-electric-grid-2011.shtml
(noting that “virtually all homes” in the United States have access to grid electricity). For a
survey of international rates for electricity, with the United States among the cheapest, see
Lindsay Wilson, The Average Price of Electricity, Country by Country, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE
(Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.theenergycollective.com/lindsay-wilson/279126/average-elec
tricity-prices-around-world-kwh.
43. See supra notes 24, 36–41 and accompanying text.
44. See HYMAN, supra note 18, at 100–05, 113–16 (including Table 14-4 that shows a R
204% increase in electricity prices from 1965–1983 and describing reasons for rising prices
and falling demand, including increased capital spending, need for improved reliability after
significant blackouts, the increasing cost of generation facilities, oil embargos, and the rise in
fuel prices); KARL MCDERMOTT, COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF ADAPTATION 20–23 (2012), http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy
/stateregulation/documents/cosr_history_final.pdf (detailing dramatic drop in demand
growth in utility industry, from approximately 7% in 1973 to 2.5% a year after 1973); DANIEL
YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 380–81 (2011)
(tying increasing prices, in part, to the passage of the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA)).
45. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 95 Pub. L. No. 617,
92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)), which re-
quired utilities to purchase energy from non-utility “qualifying facilities,” primarily small
renewable energy projects, exemplified a new national desire to diversify the nation’s energy
supply away from fossil fuels. PURPA also demonstrated a growing national interest in
conservation. 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012) (requiring state utility commissions to consider con-
servation in ratemaking); see also CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
588–90 tbl. 12-3, 594–95 (1993) (listing environmental statutes that affect utility operations
and describing impact on utility planning).
46. Integrated resource plans (IRPs) project customer demand and supply options over
an extended period of time, often 10–20 years, and are used by utility commissions to deter-
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lation;47 new environmentally-based targets for renewable energy48 and en-
ergy efficiency;49 and most recently, a sharp growth in distributed
generation and grid modernization.50
mine optimal portfolios of supply and demand resources. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, 16
U.S.C. § 2602(19) (2012) (defining integrated resource planning as “a planning and selection
process for new energy resources that evaluates the full range of alternatives, including new
generating capacity, power purchases, energy conservation and efficiency, cogeneration and
district heating and cooling applications, and renewable energy resources, in order to provide
adequate and reliable service to its electric customers at the lowest system cost”). Depending
on the jurisdiction, IRPs might be used as advisory documents or as evidence in determining
prudence during utility commission proceedings. See generally RACHEL WILSON & PAUL PETER-
SON, A BRIEF SURVEY OF STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING RULES AND REQUIREMENTS 3–13
(2011), http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ACSF_IRP-Survey_Final
_2011-04-28.pdf (offering an overview of the IRP process and a survey of state regulations,
including the 26 states that have a mandatory IRP process). See also Scott F. Bertschi, Com-
ment, Integrated Resource Planning and Demand-Side Management in Electric Utility Regulation:
Public Utility Panacea or a Waste of Energy?, 43 EMORY L.J. 815, 829–36 (1994) (detailing
regulatory requirements of IRP processes).
47. For a history of deregulation in electric markets, see Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can
Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS.
BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 6–16 (2004). See also Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause
Brinkmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545
(2005) (describing deregulation at the federal and state level). Although 24 states initially
passed some form of electric deregulation, as of 2010, only fifteen states had active deregula-
tion at the retail level. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Status of Electricity Restructuring by
State, ELECTRICITY, http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect
.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2016) (showing a state-by-state map of information about electric
restructuring with links to individual state legislation). See generally TYSON SLOCUM, THE FAIL-
URE OF ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: HISTORY, STATUS AND NEEDED REFORMS (2007), https://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/Energy%20Markets%20in%20the%2021st
%20Century%3A%20Competition%20Policy%20in%20Perspective/slocum_dereg.pdf (de-
scribing the rush to deregulation and subsequent retrenchment).
48. Currently, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have a Renewable Port-
folio Standard (RPS), which sets hard targets for the percentage of electric generation from
renewable resources; an additional eight have an RPS with soft targets. See, e.g., DATABASE OF
STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY (DSIRE) ET AL., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STAN-
DARD POLICIES (2015), http://www.dsireusa.org/resources/detailed-summary-maps/ (follow
link to summary map of renewable portfolio standards); see also BARRY RABE, RACE TO THE TOP:
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 5–6 (2006), http://
www.c2es.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf (describing history and growth in renewable
portfolio standards, and providing a chart of qualifying renewable energy sources by state).
49. For a description of the development of state utility energy efficiency programs,
including energy efficiency budgets, spending, and scorecards rating individual state per-
formance, see DAN YORK ET AL., THREE DECADES AND COUNTING: A HISTORICAL REVIEW AND CUR-
RENT ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRIC UTILITY ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTIVITY IN THE STATES 2–23 (2012),
http://www.aceee.org/research-report/u123. For a current overview and assessment of state
policies and programs, see ANNIE GILLEO ET AL., THE 2015 STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD
(2015), http://www.aceee.org/research-report/u123. See also Kenneth Gillingham et al., En-
ergy Efficiency Policies: A Retrospective Examination, 31 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 161, 162
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This Part analyzes current trends in the utility industry, including de-
clining growth, increasing distributed resources, calls for decarbonization,
and twenty-first century customer demands, such as data monitoring,
cyber-security, and improved reliability.
A. Market Trends
Utilities today are bombarded by a multitude of changes. When looking
at the markets in which utilities operate, two trends stand out as presenting
particular challenges to the existing regulatory paradigm: declining growth
rates and a demand for new products and services.
1. Declining Growth
In the early days of cost-of-service ratemaking, as economies of scale
increased and costs declined, utilities relied upon growth in demand to fuel
expansion and drive profits.51 Regulators had few occasions to doubt the
prudence of and need for capital expansion, as demand grew by nearly
double-digit figures and the system capacity had to double approximately
every 10 years.52
This rosy picture changed after 1970, when utilities lost two of the key
elements of their financial success: growth and increasing economies of
scale. Growth rates first began to slow as the United States experienced a
series of oil embargos, declining oil production, and fuel price spikes.53
These events drove fears that the world was fast approaching the tipping
point toward the ultimate decline in energy resources, and prompted a na-
tional drive for energy conservation.54 After a period of improvement in the
(2006) (reviewing literature on both utility and non-utility energy efficiency programs, in-
cluding financial incentives, appliance standards, and policies concerning government energy
use).
50. See infra Section II.A.
51. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 44, at 21; Johannes P. Pfeifenberger & William B Tye, R
Handle with Care: A Primer on Incentive Regulation, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 769, 769 (1995) (noting
that so-called “regulatory lag” can be beneficial in a time of decreasing costs). In contrast,
during times of rising costs and declining growth, the lag between rate cases can significantly
impede the utility’s ability to earn the rate of return established during the previous rate
case. See David Malkin & Paul A. Centolella, Results-Based Regulation: A More Dynamic Ap-
proach to Grid Modernization, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2014, at 28, 33.
52. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 44, at 21–22 (stating the period after 1970 was the first R
in which utility investors  became concerned with “regulatory risk,” or the risk that regulators
would not approve the recovery of certain capital investments); Sioshansi, supra note 3, at 65
(describing growth rates after World War II as the “golden age” of the industry).
53. See YERGIN, supra note 44, at 234–35 (describing oil embargos and searches for new R
supplies).
54. See id. at 235. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter warned the United States that oil
was running out, conditions were dire, and conservation was essential. “Now we have a
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1990s, growth rates took a sharp dive during the Great Recession.55 Today,
the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates a less than 1% an-
nual growth rate in demand until 2035 (the end of the forecast period), even
without new mandates for additional efficiency or new regulatory policies
encouraging conservation.56 Analysts Black & Veatch estimate a slightly
higher annual growth rate of 1% from 2014–2029, still well below the histor-
ical average.57
There are a multitude of reasons for this decline in growth, including
the maturity of the industry, increasing efficiency by end users, and satura-
tion of the market.58 Remarkably, industry analyses suggest significant po-
tential for additional efficiency gains and an accompanying additional drop
in demand.59
choice. But if we wait, we will live in fear of embargoes. We could endanger our freedom as a
sovereign nation to act in foreign affairs. Within ten years we would not be able to import
enough oil—from any country, at any acceptable price.” Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S.,
The President’s Proposed Energy Policy (April 18, 1977), in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol.
XXXXIII, No. 14, May 1, 1977, at 418–20. For a transcript of this speech, which may be best
remembered for the statement that the effort to conserve will be the “moral equivalent of
war,” see Pub. Broad. Serv., Primary Resources: Proposed Energy Policy, AMERICAN EXPERIENCE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/carter-energy/
(last visited Apr. 2, 2016). See also TOMAIN, supra note 7, at 27 (describing the speech and the R
subsequent passage of the National Energy Act).
55. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW app. C, EL-8 (2015), http:/
/energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/QER_AppendixC_Electricity.pdf (showing historic
and future projected electric demand growth from 1950–2040, alongside U.S. GDP). The
entire report is available at http://energy.gov/epsa/downloads/quadrennial-energy-review-
full-report.
56. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Economy and Electricity Demand Growth Are
Linked but Relationship Is Changing, TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10491 (providing data suggesting that economic growth now
outpaces electric demand growth, and predicting electric demand growth will not rebound
with increased economic growth).
57. See BLACK & VEATCH, 2014 STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS: U.S. ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 26 (2014),
http://bv.com/docs/default-source/reports-studies/14-sdr-electric-report (noting that slow
growth comes despite retirement of coal-fired generation due to compliance with new air
toxics regulations).
58. Sioshansi, supra note 3, at 66–67.
59. The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) estimates that
new cost effective energy efficiency programs could reduce U.S. energy requirements by 59%
by 2050. See JOHN A. “SKIP” LAITNER ET AL., AM . COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., THE
LONG-TERM ENERGY EFFICIENCY POTENTIAL: WHAT THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS, at v–vii (2012), http:/
/www.aceee.org/research-report/e121 (referring to an aggressive scenario known as the
“Phoenix case,” which includes penetration of advanced technologies as well as new infra-
structure improvements). The landmark 2009 McKinsey & Co. report, which analyzed cost
effective energy efficiency and barriers to its adoption, estimated that energy efficiency pro-
grams could save more than $500 billion in energy savings by 2020 and reduce energy use by
23%. See HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY, at
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While growth rates have significantly declined, this trend does not nec-
essarily equate to a declining need for utility investment. Although minimal
or flat growth may diminish the need for expanded generation capacity, the
electric power system still requires significant investment in replacement
generation capacity.60 The Edison Electric Institute forecasts utility invest-
ments in transmission to be significantly higher in coming years, simply to
alleviate existing transmission constraints and upgrade existing
infrastructure.61
Compliance with environmental regulations, including the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) new Clean Power Plan,62 as well as
regulations regarding mercury and air toxics,63 surface water intake,64 and
coal ash,65 is also expected to require significant capital investment over the
next five years.66 Meeting the demands of distributed generation and decar-
bonization of the utility system, with a shift to renewable generation and
iii (2009), http://www.mckinsey.com/Client_Service/Electric_Power_and_Natural_Gas/Lat
est_thinking/~/media/204463A4D27A419BA8D05A6C280A97DC.ashx. Amory Lovins
from the Rocky Mountain Institute estimated in 2011 that energy efficiency could reduce
energy use by approximately 40% by 2050. See AMORY LOVINS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST.,
REINVENTING FIRE 11 (2011). Lovins further estimates that within the building industry, en-
ergy use savings of 38% to 69% are possible by 2050. Id. at 86.
60. See MARC W. CHUPKA ET AL., THE EDISON FOUND., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S POWER
INDUSTRY: THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 2010–2030, at 2 (2008), http://www.eei.org/ourissues/
finance/Documents/Transforming_Americas_Power_Industry_Exec_Summary.pdf (estimat-
ing a need for $697 billion in new generation investments by 2030, under existing policies
with no new carbon constraints).
61. See id. at 5 (estimating a need for $880 billion in transmission and distribution
investment for the reference case); EDISON ELEC. INST., ACTUAL AND PLANNED TRANSMISSION
INVESTMENT BY INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES 2009–2018, at 1 (2015), http://www.eei.org/is-
suesandpolicy/transmission/documents/bar_transmission_investment.pdf (depicting annual
estimates of new transmission investments needed to ensure reliability and ease congestion).
62. The Clean Power Plan sets carbon and other greenhouse gas emission standards for
power plants, while providing states with significant flexibility in meeting those standards.
See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, CLEAN POWER PLAN,
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants (last visited
Apr. 2, 2016) (summarizing the rule and providing links to documents, including the regula-
tory impact analysis, rule history, and final rule). The U.S. Supreme Court stayed the Clean
Power Plan on February 9, 2016, pending review. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000
(Feb. 9, 2016) (mem.) (No. 15A773), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
020916zr_21p3.pdf.
63. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 40 C.F.R. § 60.45Da
(2015); 40 C.F.R. pt. 63 (2015).
64. EPA Administered Permit Programs: The National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System, 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 (2015); Criteria and Standards for the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. pt. 125 (2015).
65. See, e.g., Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 40 C.F.R.
pt. 257 (2015); Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 (2015).
66. See BLACK & VEATCH, supra note 57, at 56–58. R
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more intermittent resources, will require still greater investments in distri-
bution and transmission.67
The problem for utilities and their customers is that the drop in de-
mand growth and potential for increased efficiency means significant new
investments will be spread across a flat or even declining number of kilowatt
hours, increasing per-unit costs and driving up rates.68 If distributed gener-
ation allows certain customers to leave the system, this problem may create
a negative cycle some have called the “death spiral,” in which lost revenues
lead to increasing rates, which drive additional customers to exit the system
through alternative distributed generation systems.69
Although it seems hyperbolic to suggest a near-term demise of the reg-
ulated utility, there can be little doubt that utilities are facing significant
pressures related to the need for new investment and declining growth, and
these pressures are likely to compound over time.70
67. See KASSAKIAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 175 (noting the necessary investments to R
replace aging facilities and expand transmission and distribution infrastructure could “easily
double” to accommodate new technologies and new types of generation). A study by the
Electric Power Research Institute in 2011 estimated that, omitting the costs for new genera-
tion, expanding transmission to add renewable resources and meet load growth would require
net investments (less benefits) of $338–$476 billion over twenty years. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH
INST., ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE SMART GRID: A PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE
INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS AND THE RESULTANT BENEFITS OF A FULLY FUNCTIONING SMART GRID 1–4
(2011), http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000
0000001022519.
68. See Liam Denning, Lights Flicker for Utilities, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304773104579270362739732266 (describing the
impact on utilities of declining growth and increasing distributed generation); Chris Martin
et al., Why the U.S. Power Grid’s Days Are Numbered, BUS. WK. (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.
bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-08-22/homegrown-green-energy-is-making-power-utilities-
irrelevant (suggesting that an increase in distributed generation threatens utility financial
stability).
69. See, e.g., Burr, supra note 2, at 21 (defining death spiral); Denning, supra note 68 R
(suggesting that “death spiral” may be an overstatement, but that utilities are struggling
financially under the impact of declining growth and increasing distributed generation); Jeff
McMahon, Utilities Want Regulatory Rescue from “Death Spiral”, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2014), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2014/02/04/utilities-want-regulatory-rescue-from-death
-spiral/.
70. Commentators differ sharply as to whether the “death spiral” is a realistic threat to
utilities. For a spirited point and counterpoint, see generally Graffy & Kihm, supra note 2
(arguing that utilities must develop new products and services in order to combat the threat
of customer desertion to distributed generation systems) and David Raskin, Getting Distrib-
uted Generation Right: A Response to “Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death Spiral for Elec-
tric Utilities?”, 35 ENERGY L.J. 263 (2014) (suggesting that, for technological and financial
reasons, customers are unlikely to leave the utility system en masse and that suggestions
otherwise inappropriately threaten necessary investment in the grid).
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2. Demand for New Services
Today’s utilities report increasing pressure to provide new services to
customers and engage with them on a different level.71 Instead of passively
using electricity whenever and at whatever level they please, customers are
increasingly seen as playing an active role in managing their demand.72 Ex-
panding customer engagement is possible through the use of smart meters,
more granular analysis of the cost of service, and two-way communications
between the utility and the consumer.73 For the first time, consumers can
access real-time data as to the cost of the energy they are consuming, al-
lowing them to shift their usage to off-peak or lower peak periods.74 For
utilities and regulators, this new level of data creates the potential for
targeted rate structures that can address system constraints and encourage
efficiency, including time-of-use and real-time pricing.75
In a related manner, utilities today have access to an unprecedented
amount of individual customer data.76 Customers expect their utility to pre-
serve this information with a high degree of privacy and security while
71. See, e.g., FOX-PENNER, supra note 7, at 189–91 (describing “energy services utility”); R
RONALD LEHR, AMERICA’S POWER PLAN, NEW UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS: UTILITY AND REGULATORY
MODELS FOR THE MODERN ERA 15–19 (2013), http://americaspowerplan.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/10/APP-UTILITIES.pdf (providing examples of new services utilities are of-
fering); AEEI, supra note 2, at 14–16 (describing new products and services utilities may be R
expected to provide in coming years). A survey of vertically integrated electric utilities con-
ducted by Black and Veatch in 2015 found that 69% planned to increase their investment in
social media over the next three to five years. BLACK & VEATCH, 2015 STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS:
U.S. ELECTRIC INDUSTRY REPORT 51 (2015), http://bv.com/reports. For utility services, “priori-
tizing customer services is an especially important point given the resurgence of demand-
side management measures being instituted that will require customer buy-in.” Id. at 52.
72. BLACK & VEATCH, supra note 71, at 53 (“Compelling customers to shift usage, rather R
than conserve it, in order to flatten peak demand is the prime goal.”); Sioshansi, supra note 3,
at 70.
73. Mark F. Ruth & Benjamin Kroposki, Energy Systems Integration: An Evolving Energy
Paradigm, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 36, 40 (2014) (citing research finding that smart grid technologies
have the capacity to deliver significant benefits, primarily from applications allowing cus-
tomers to shift demand from high peak to lower peak periods).
74. Sioshansi, supra note 3, at 70. Black & Veatch reports that utilities are just begin-
ning to work actively with customers to provide real time data and shift usage away from
peak periods. BLACK & VEATCH, supra note 71, at 44. The Advanced Energy Economy Institute R
(AEEI) describes innovation in electric products and services, including tools for managing
usage and shifting demand away from peak periods, as one of the key elements of the future
of the utility system. See AEEI, supra note 2, at 12–13. R
75. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. (RMI), RATE DESIGN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: ELECTRIC-
ITY PRICING FOR A DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE FUTURE 26–27 (2014), http://www.rmi.org/
elab_rate_design.
76. See Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 161, 165–67 (2011) (detailing new data that utilities can or will be able to access through
smart meters).
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being prepared to share the information with the individual customer or
with alternative providers of energy services.77 Thus, the utility of today
must become an expert in information management, data sharing, cyber
security, and privacy. In addition, the system must be kept secure from
attack—both physical and cyber—at a level of threat not previously exper-
ienced.78 And finally, with an increasing number of extreme weather events,
utility systems must become more resilient than before, less likely to fail
during weather events, and faster to recover after outages.79
B. Distributed Energy Resources
Perhaps the most pressing technological issue facing utilities today is
the expansion of distributed resources and concomitant need for new distri-
bution infrastructure.80 Where Samuel Insull once designed his utility
around a large central generating facility, with a one-way grid that delivered
electricity into his customers’ businesses and homes, utilities today are in-
creasingly asked to accommodate distributed generation sources, including
residential solar, commercial solar and wind, and co-generation.81 Electric
77. See Samuel J. Harvey, Smart Meters, Smarter Regulation: Balancing Privacy and Inno-
vation in the Electric Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2068, 2084–86 (2014) (discussing how customer
privacy concerns can impede adoption of automated meter infrastructure); Sonia K. McNeil,
Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 215 (2011) (citing surveys finding
that customers do not want their usage data shared outside the utility). For a discussion of
non-utility service providers, particularly entities providing products and services related to
the smart grid and energy efficiency, and privacy concerns related to their use of customer
data, see Andreas S. V. Wokutch, The Role of Non-Utility Service Providers in Smart Grid
Development: Should They Be Regulated, and if So, Who Can Regulate Them?, 9 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 531, 535–38, 543–44 (2011).
78. See Roland L. Trope & Stephen J. Humes, Before Rolling Blackouts Begin: Briefing
Boards on Cyber Attacks that Target and Degrade the Grid, 40 WM . MITCHELL L. REV. 647, 656
(2014) (identifying risks to the utility grid posed by cyber attack); Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity
Policy for the Electricity Sector: The First Step to Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure, 19 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 326–31 (2013) (describing the need for cybersecurity in the electric
sector and difficulty posed by technical and governance challenges).
79. See U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
AND EXTREME WEATHER 35–36 (2013), http://energy.gov/downloads/us-energy-sector-vulnera
bilities-climate-change-and-extreme-weather (warning of the potential disruptions to U.S.
energy supply and electric grid as a result of climate change and extreme weather events);
Kevin B. Jones et al., The Urban Microgrid: Smart Legal and Regulatory Policies to Support
Electric Grid Resiliency and Climate Mitigation, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1700–01 (2014)
(describing the need for increased resilience and potential role for microgrids).
80. See LOVINS, supra note 59, at 206–09 (providing a definition, overview, and descrip- R
tion of distributed resources).
81. See Rob Neumann & Ralph Zarumba, Distributed Generation: Disruptive Technology
or Regulatory Challenge, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2015, at 28, 29–30 (describing the growth of
distributed generation and noting the variety of ways it may be integrated into a utility
system); Ruth & Kroposki, supra note 73, at 44 (analyzing benefits of integrating distributed R
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demand in the future may be met by a traditional generating resource, but
may also be met by demand response or energy efficiency programs.82
Commercial installations or residential communities may opt for a
microgrid that aggregates distributed resources and provides electric ser-
vices that are either wholly or partially separate from the utility grid.83
Regulators and customers expect the distribution grid to evolve to meet
this demand with two-way systems capable of balancing intermittent re-
sources while still maintaining high levels of reliability. Yet in many areas,
the grid is already strained by a relatively small number of distributed re-
sources.84 Meanwhile, most analysts agree that the grid will require signifi-
cant investment before it can accommodate the penetration of distributed
resources envisioned by clean energy proponents while also meeting mod-
ern demands for data processing, cybersecurity, and privacy.85
Although the costs are significant, the benefits of distributed generation
for the future electric power system have the potential to be even greater.
Renewable resources, including residential solar and community wind, can
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel dependency.86 Distribution
resources across energy systems, including combined heat and power (CHP)); Gina S. War-
ren, Vanishing Power Lines and Emerging Distributed Generation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
347, 352–64 (2014) (providing history of the development of the energy delivery system,
including the vertically integrated system favored by Samuel Insull).
82. See Kenneth Gillingham et al., Energy Efficiency Policies: A Retrospective Examina-
tion, 31 ANN. REV. ENV’T. & RESOURCES 161, 162 (2006) (detailing a variety of energy effi-
ciency programs, including utility incentives, building codes, and transportation policies).
Demand response programs engage customers in modifying their load to reduce or shift peak
demand, or to control load through the use of automatic programs or incentives. See U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, Demand Response, ENERGY.GOV: OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY
RELIABILITY, http://energy.gov/oe/technology-development/smart-grid/demand-response (last
visited Apr. 2, 2016).
83. See Twaite, supra note 7, at 976–78 (2010) (recommending a consistent statutory
scheme to reduce barriers to microgrid adoption).
84. See Griselda Blackburn et al., Solar Valuation and the Modern Utility’s Expansion into
Distributed Generation, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 18, 19, 21 (2013) (citing the need for system upgrades
due to distributed solar installations).
85. See N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework
and Implementation Plan (Track One), Case 14-M-0101, at 16–17, 20, 25 (Feb. 26, 2015)
[hereinafter REV Order] (describing a need to replace aging infrastructure, including distri-
bution grid); NADEL & HERNDON, supra note 8, at 42–43 (citing state reports on grid moderni- R
zation); Ruth & Kroposki, supra note 73, at 36, 38 (estimating total investments in R
transmission and distribution necessary to modernize the grid ranging up to more than $1
trillion).
86. See 1 NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (NREL), 2012 RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES
STUDY 2–9 (M.M. Hand et al. eds., 2012), http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/re_futures/ (finding
increased renewable electricity supply reduced direct carbon emissions by up to 95% in a 90%
renewable energy scenario); see also Ralph E.H. Sims et al., Carbon Emission and Mitigation
Cost Comparisons Between Fossil Fuel, Nuclear and Renewable Energy Resources for Electricity
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grid enhancements improve overall reliability by providing more granular
outage data that assists in recovery efforts and allows the utility to manage
local outages before they create system-wide disturbances.87 Microgrids can
also enhance resilience and enable quicker recovery after extreme weather
events.88
For utilities, however, distributed resources create a number of chal-
lenges. At the most basic level, distributed generation owned by non-utility
entities represents a disruption of the regulated monopoly concept.89 The
growth of distributed resources also forces utilities to develop new services
to accommodate customer demand, such as load management and support
for interconnection.90
Another challenge created by distributed generation is the technological
difficulty of meeting new customer demands. Most existing distribution
systems were not intended to provide the two-way grid access distributed
resources require, and in areas of high renewable penetration, the grid is
showing the strain.91 Accommodating distributed generation will require
new infrastructure, which means additional costs.92 Distributed generation,
when provided by renewable resources such as solar and wind, is also chal-
Generation, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 1315, 1315 (2003) (finding that the global electric industry could
reduce both generation costs and greenhouse gas emissions by increasing penetration of re-
newable resources, switching to lower carbon fuels, and sequestering carbon emissions).
87. See generally U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID INVESTMENTS IMPROVE GRID RELIABIL-
ITY, RESILIENCE, AND STORM RESPONSES (2014) http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/12/f19/
SG-ImprovesRestoration-Nov2014.pdf (analyzing improvements in outage management at
three smart grid projects and extrapolating findings).
88. See NADEL & HERNDON, supra note 8, at 979–82; Jones et al., supra note 79, at R
1699–1701; James Newcomb et al., Distributed Energy Resources: Policy Implications of Decentral-
ization, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 65, 71 (2013) (describing benefits of microgrids).
89. Black and Veatch’s 2015 survey of utility sector participants, including publicly-
owned utilities, investor-owned utilities, cooperatives, and independent power producers,
found that 77% felt it was important to adjust the regulatory construct to recognize changes
in the energy market, with 86.1% of investor-owned utilities rating a change in the regulatory
construct as “important.” BLACK & VEATCH, supra note 71, at 48–49. R
90. See Tomain, supra note 12, at 516–18 (describing a variety of new energy products R
and services utilities are starting to offer); Wiedman & Beach, supra note 7, at 94–95, 102 R
(describing shared renewable programs and the potential for utilities to engage in “integrated
distribution planning” to address interconnection issues). NY’s REV proceeding envisions
that utilities will someday provide a variety of grid services, including ancillary services and
load management, “value-added electric services, such as fixed commodity pricing,” and “al-
ternative supply models such as community aggregation, microgrids and community based
solar and/or storage.” REV Order, supra note 85, at 33–34. R
91. See Blackburn et al., supra note 84, at 21.
92. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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lenging because it is intermittent, putting strain on the distribution grid to
accommodate the variation in demand and supply.93
C. Decarbonization
Scientists agree that the earth is warming, the climate is becoming more
volatile, and greenhouse gasses (GHGs), primarily carbon dioxide, are to
blame.94 Climate change is already occurring, with devastating effects.95 In
the U.S., wildfire and drought have ravaged the Northwest and Califor-
nia.96 The fishing industry has lost billions of dollars from closed fisheries
due to an abnormally large toxic algae bloom in the Pacific.97 Military ex-
perts agree that climate change threatens national security and may lead to
an increase in terrorism.98 Extreme weather events are occurring with
93. See KASSAKIAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 55–56 (describing the challenge of integrating R
distributed and renewable resources into the utility grid).
94. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the leading interna-
tional scientific organization in the field of climate change assessment. See Organization, IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/
organization.shtml#.UQxmXmfC5bI (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). For more information about
the IPCC and recent publications, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC),
http://www.ipcc.ch/index.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). As the most recent summary for
policymakers states, “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s,
many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.” INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS: CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 2 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/
AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.
95. See C.B. FIELD ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), SUM -
MARY FOR POLICYMAKERS: CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, PART
A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 4–8 (2014), http://ipcc wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/
WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf (summarizing global impacts of climate change).
96. Ralph Ellis & Laura Smith-Spark, Wildfires Threaten Homes in Idaho, Washington,
California and Oregon, CNN (Aug. 16, 2015, 10:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/16/us/
western-states-wildfires/.
97. Tom Hallman, Jr., Biggest-Ever Toxic Algal Bloom Hits West Coast, Shutting Down
Shellfish Industries, OREGONLIVE (June 17, 2015, 10:39 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/paci
fic-northwest-news/index.ssf/2015/06/west_coast_shellfish_industrie.html.
98. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, a public document released by the U.S.
Department of Defense to describe current U.S. military policy, describes climate change as
a “threat multiplier” that can “enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence.” U.S.
DEP ’T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 2014, at 8 (2014), http://www.defense.gov/
pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. A 2014 report by the CNA Military Advisory
Board calls climate change a “catalyst for instability and conflict.” MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD,
THE CNA CORPORATION, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ACCELERATING RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2
(2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1180456/cna-military-
advisory-board-report.pdf. “‘In the past, the thinking was that climate change multiplied the
significance of a situation,’ said Gen. Charles F. Wald, who contributed to both reports and
is retired from the Air Force. ‘Now we’re saying it’s going to be a direct cause of instabil-
ity.’” Coral Davenport, Climate Change Deemed Growing Security Threat by Military Researchers,
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greater frequency and intensity,99 and sea level rise is damaging roads,
bridges, and commercial and residential developments.100 Although some
believe that the opportunity to limit warming to 2 degrees Celsius (the
previously agreed-upon limit) has already passed,101 most agree the oppor-
tunity to forestall worst-case scenarios of four degrees (or more) of warming
still remain.102
The energy sector contributes the majority of U.S. GHG emissions and
therefore holds important promise for mitigation.103 The EPA has con-
cluded that GHG emissions are air pollutants that threaten the health and
safety of U.S. citizens and is taking steps to curb GHG emissions from
power plants.104 Meanwhile, international efforts to reach a new agreement
to reduce GHG emissions globally culminated with the meeting of the
UNFCCC parties (COP21) in Paris in December 2015, at which an historic
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/us/politics/climate-
change-deemed-growing-security-threat-by-military-researchers.html?_r=0; see also Arija
Flowers, National Security in the 21st Century: How the National Security Council Can Solve the
President’s Climate Change Problem, 11 SUS. DEV. L. & POL’Y 50, 51–52 (2011) (describing
indirect effects of climate change and international security challenges).
99. Sarah Lyall, Heat, Flood or Icy Cold, Extreme Weather Rages Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/science/earth/extreme-weather-grows-
in-frequency-and-intensity-around-world.html.
100. See ERIKA SPANGER-SIEGFRIED ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, ENCROACHING
TIDES: HOW SEA LEVEL RISE AND TIDAL FLOODING THREATEN U.S. EAST AND GULF COAST COMMU-
NITIES OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS 1–2 (2014).
101. The current rate of emissions is estimated to bring global temperature increases in
the range of 3.7 to 4.8 °C by 2100. O. EDENHOFER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (IPCC), SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS: CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 10 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_sum
mary-for-policymakers.pdf.
102. For a discussion of the devastating impacts of a four degree world, see FIELD ET AL.,
supra note 95, at 13 and HANS JOACHIM SCHELLNHUBER ET AL., WORLD BANK, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4 DEGREE CELSIUS WARMER WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED (2014),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/11/17485703/turn-down-heat-4-degree-cel
sius-warmer-world-must-avoided-executive-summary.
103. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990 – 2010, at ES-12 (2012), www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/
US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf (“Energy-related activities, primarily fossil fuel
combustion, accounted for the vast majority of U.S. CO2 emissions for the period of 1990
through 2010. . . . Overall, emission sources in the Energy chapter account for a combined
87.0[%] of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2010.”). Electricity generation is the larg-
est single source of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States, accounting for 42% of all
carbon dioxide emissions. Id. at 3–11.
104. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,664 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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agreement was reached to limit global warming to less than two degrees
Celsius.105
For the U.S. to substantially lower GHG emissions from the energy
sector, it will have to decarbonize the electric power system.106 A recent
study by the National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) concludes that the
U.S. can transition to producing 80% of its electricity from renewable re-
sources by 2050 without significant new technological breakthroughs.107
Such a transition would take political will—and a significant financial
commitment.108
Aside from the necessity to address climate change, many other reasons
exist to move the electric power sector away from fossil fuels. Analysts have
long pointed to the financial and technological benefits of energy efficiency,
which can cost-effectively reduce demand, lower consumer bills, and reduce
the need for new transmission and distribution infrastructure.109 In many
regions, renewable resources have either reached financial parity with fossil
fuel resources or are even cheaper.110 Renewable resources and energy effi-
105. For a variety of resources describing the COP21 agreement and its implementation
around the world, see United Nations Conference on Climate Change, What Was COP21?,
LEARN, http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). See also Coral Davenport,
Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change-accord-paris.html?_r=0.
106. See GRANGER MORGAN ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE U.S.
ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 1 (2005), http://www.c2es.org/
docUploads/Electricity_Final.pdf.
107. See 1 NREL, supra note 86, at iii; see also Mark Jaffe, Op-Ed., Renewable Energy
Could Provide 80% of US Electricity – But at What Cost?, DENVER POST (July 9, 2012, 12:20
PM), http://blogs.denverpost.com/thebalancesheet/2012/07/09/renewable-energy/5430/
(“The impact on electricity rates varies with the scenarios but the range is $130 to $161 a
megawatt-hour compared with a average business-as-usual baseline rate of $111 – on the low
end a 21 percent increase to transform the nation’s electricity system.”).
108. 1 NREL, supra note 86, at A-29 (estimating range of additional costs for a high
renewable portfolio future varying according to level of penetration, with a potential cost
differential of 29% in the highest penetration scenario).
109. See NADEL & HERNDON, supra note 8, at vii–viii. Nadel and Herndon have found R
that energy efficiency policies and programs have contributed significantly to slowing elec-
tric demand growth. Id. at 1. Energy efficiency remains the cheapest alternative to new
generating resources, including natural gas, coal, and wind. Id. at 3.
110. See RON BINZ ET AL., CERES, PRACTICING RISK-AWARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION: 2014 UP -
DATE 8–10, 15 (2014), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/practicing-risk-aware-electric-
ity-regulation-2014-update. Deutsche Bank has concluded that solar PV is below the retail
price for electricity in many markets globally, and the price is expected to drop another 40%
in the next 4–5 years. DEUTSCHE BANK, SOLAR GRID PARITY IN A LOW OIL PRICE ERA 1, 9–10
(2015), https://www.db.com/cr/en/concrete-deutsche-bank-report-solar-grid-parity-in-a-low-
oil-price-era.htm; see also BINZ ET AL., supra, at 8–10 (discussing falling prices for renewable
resources, particularly solar); NADEL & HERNDON, supra note 8, at 3 (illustrating the range of R
costs per lifetime kWh for various generating resources, with energy efficiency as the lowest
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ciency also entail lower financial risk because they do not require ongoing
access to fuel, which may vary in price and availability over the life of a
resource.111
Another reason to shift to clean energy is that dependence on fossil fuel
puts U.S. military personnel in harm’s way and restricts strategic initiatives
and opportunities.112 For this reason, the U.S. military has made significant
and unprecedented investments in renewable energy.113
The move to decarbonize the electric power system will require work
on a number of fronts. Over time, fossil fuel resources will be retired and
new renewable resources added to the generation mix.114 New demand can
be met in part with cost-effective demand response and energy efficiency.115
cost resource, and wind and natural gas as the next lowest, depending on the point in the
range considered).
111. For a complete analysis of the cost/risk profile of various electric generation re-
sources, see BINZ ET AL., supra note 110, at 14–17.
112. A 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office states, “DOD’s high fuel
requirements on the battlefield can place a significant logistics burden on military forces,
limit the range and pace of operations, and add to mission risks.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: OVERARCHING ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK COULD IMPROVE
DOD’S MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY REDUCTION EFFORTS FOR MILITARY OPERATION 5 (2008), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/120/119405.pdf (statement of William M. Solis, Director Defense Capa-
bilities and Management). Estimates suggest that of the casualties in Afghanistan caused by
improvised explosive devices, 10% occur on roads during resupply missions. Siddhartha M.
Velandy, The Green Arms Race: Reorienting the Discussions on Climate Change, Energy Policy, and
National Security, 3 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 309, 328 (2012).
113. See AM . COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, 2014 INDUSTRY REVIEW: RENEWABLE ENERGY
FOR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 4 (2014), http://acore.org/files/pdfs/Renewable-Energy-for-Mili
tary-Installations.pdf.
114. See 1 NREL, supra note 86, at xxxiv (“[A]chieving high renewable electricity fu-
tures would require a sustained increase in renewable capacity additions.”); Nils Johnson et
al., Stranded on a Low-Carbon Planet: Implications of Climate Policy for the Phase-Out of Coal-
Based Power Plants, 90 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 89, 89 (2015) (noting that trans-
forming the electric power system to one fueled by 80% renewable resources is dependent on
phasing out fossil-fuel based electric generation). The NREL study found that the role of
fossil-fuel fired plants in a high-renewable future is highly uncertain, due to a variety of
factors, including the impact of new regulations, which may require the phase-out of coal-
fired plants for other reasons. See 1 NREL, supra note 86, at 1-14 to 1-15. However, even
absent new carbon policies, coal-fired power plants are expected to retire at increasing rates
due to fuel costs, competition with cheap natural gas, and the cost of compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Scheduled 2015 Capacity Additions
Mostly Wind and Natural Gas; Retirements Mostly Coal, TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar. 10, 2015),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20292.
115. See generally AM . COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., CHANGE IS IN THE AIR:
HOW STATES CAN HARNESS ENERGY EFFICIENCY TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMY AND REDUCE POLLU-
TION (2014), http://aceee.org/files/pdf/summary/e1401-summary.pdf. In 2010, the Northwest
Public Power Planning Council estimated that 85% of load growth in the Pacific Northwest
could be met with cost effective energy efficiency through 2030. NW. POWER & CONSERVATION
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To accommodate these new resources, the distribution and transmission
grids will have to be significantly upgraded and expanded.116 New technolo-
gies for controlling load will have to be implemented.117 Instead of focusing
on new supply resources, a paradigm shift will have to occur in which de-
mand response programs and storage enable utilities to shift load.118 All of
these efforts will require commitment from regulators and utilities.
D. Does Financial Stability Still Matter?
Financial stability and investor confidence were once considered basic
regulatory goals, and they still appear, at least at a basic level, in many
discussions of the future of the electric industry. The Advanced Energy
Economy Institute’s (AEEI) working group on the future of California’s
electric system holds as a guiding principle that “regulatory and market cer-
tainty will accelerate progress” and notes that “greater market certainty will
be important to help attract needed financing and investment.”119 Minne-
sota’s “e21 Initiative,” an unofficial, stakeholder-driven process to develop a
new regulatory framework for utilities, concludes that two of its primary
intended outcomes are “an economically viable utility” and “timely and pre-
dictable recovery of utilities’ fixed costs.”120
On the other hand, some analyses of the evolution of the utility pay
little attention to this formerly important goal. For example, New York’s
Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) proceeding, which was intended to
“reorient both the electric industry and ratemaking paradigm . . . [and
achieve] the development of a resilient, climate-friendly energy system,”
adopted six key objectives, none of which concern utility financial stabil-
ity.121 In the midst of fights over residential solar and fixed energy charges,
some commentators have decried utility attempts to raise fixed charges and
offered alternatives such as “better management” to address lost revenues,
COUNCIL, COUNCIL DOCUMENT 2010-09, SIXTH NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER
PLAN 1 (2010), http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/6/default.htm.
116. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
117. 1 NREL, supra note 86, at xviii (noting that a more flexible system and new tech-
nology would be required to accommodate increasing levels of renewable resources).
118. Sioshansi, supra note 3, at 72 (discussing the shift to viewing demand as flexible,
rather than just supply).
119. AEEI, supra note 2, at 6. R
120. E21 INITIATIVE, supra note 5, at 5 (identifying issues, challenges, and desired out- R
comes related to the utility business model).
121. REV Order, supra note 85, at 3–4 (noting that the six key objective are: enhanced
customer engagement, market animation, system-wide efficiency, fuel and resource diversity,
system reliability and resiliency, and reduction of carbon emissions).
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without offering ways for utilities to recover lost revenue and maintain cur-
rent levels of financial stability.122
Recent financial metrics suggest that utilities are no longer providing
the same level of confidence to investors as they have in past decades. In
recent years, financial analysts have repeatedly downgraded recommenda-
tions for utility securities.123 Utility bond ratings have shown marked de-
clines since 1970.124 Barclays made headlines in 2014 when it downgraded
the entire utility sector based on threats from residential solar, storage, and
the potential failure of the regulatory compact.125 The language in the Bar-
clays report is instructive: “While the regulator/utility construct has usually
resulted in low-risk returns to credit in the past, technological change cre-
ates precisely the environment where slower-moving incumbents and their
regulators can fall behind the curve, risking credit volatility, or disrupt the
regulatory compact, possibly leading to unexpected losses for
bondholders.”126
What does this increasing strain on utility financial security mean for
regulatory goals? At a minimum, it suggests that regulators must continue
to monitor and be responsive to investor concerns, particularly in light of
today’s changing market conditions. Increased renewable capacity and dis-
122. See Seth Nowak, Some Utilities Are Rushing to Raise Fixed Charges. That Would Be Bad
for the Economy and Your Utility Bill, AM . COUNCIL FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. (Dec. 5, 2014,
3:08 PM), http://aceee.org/blog/2014/12/some-utilities-are-rushing-raise-fixe (urging against
increasing fixed charges and “Utilities shouldn’t take away customers’ ability to control their
electricity bills or dilute the benefits that energy efficiency brings to the nation”); NADEL &
HERNDON, supra note 8, at 22–24 (offering recommendations for better management tech- R
niques at utilities).
123. See Michael Aneiro, Barclays Downgrades Electric Utility Bonds, Sees Viable Solar
Competition, BARRON’S (May 23, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://blogs.barrons.com/incomeinvesting/
2014/05/23/barclays-downgrades-electric-utility-bonds-sees-viable-solar-competition; Morgan
Stanley Sees 10% Upside in 2015; Downgrades (Healthcare, Tech, Utilities, Ind.), Upgrades




124. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 44, at 20 (showing the percent of electric utility bond R
ratings at A- or higher drop from over 90% in 1970 to approximately 20% in 2009). A recent
industry analysis suggests that the credit markets for utilities bottomed out in 2003, with an
average credit rating of BBB-. See EDISON ELEC. INST., 2014 FINANCIAL REVIEW: ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE U.S. INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 1 (2014), http://www.eei.org/resources
andmedia/industrydataanalysis/industryfinancialanalysis/finreview/Pages/default.aspx. The
average credit rating in 2014 was BBB+, and rating agency reports suggest the market has
stabilized. Id. at 72–74.
125. See Rob Wile, Barclays Has the Best Explanation Yet of How Solar Will Destroy
America’s Electric Utilities, BUS. INSIDER (May 28, 2014, 9:51 AM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/barclays-downgrades-utilities-on-solar-threat-2014-5#ixzz3kR5iR215.
126. Aneiro, supra note 123 (citing Barclays report).
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tributed generation require significant investment in transmission and dis-
tribution infrastructure, and if recovery of the cost of these projects
becomes uncertain, the cost of capital for these investments will increase.127
In addition, regulators must be cognizant of the constitutional limits estab-
lished in the Hope and Bluefield cases.128 Utility investors are entitled to a
return commensurate with the risks of similarly situated industries; if regu-
latory risk increases, investors will be entitled to higher rates of return.129
While utilities are currently still able to attract capital and ensure financial
viability, regulators must ensure that this remains the case going forward.
III. NEW UTILITY GOALS AND PRIORITIES
Regulators, industry insiders, and environmentalists are by no means
united in their vision for the reimagined electric power system. However,
based on the foregoing analysis of current market trends and the literature
regarding the future of the utility system, this Part identifies key goals and
priorities for the new utility system and considers whether the new goals
and incentives created by the current regulatory structure remain in
alignment.
A. New Utility Goals
The prioritization and magnitude of the goals for the electric industry
shift according to the perspective of the goal-setter, but certain commonali-
ties emerge from an analysis of the literature. This Section presents key
trends identified at the federal, state, and local level.
1. Decarbonization
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated
that decarbonizing electric generation is a “key measure” for mitigating cli-
mate change.130 The U.S. EPA asserts, “Reducing CO2 emissions from
power plants, and driving investment in clean energy technologies strategies
that do so, is an essential step in lessening the impacts of climate change
127. See KASSAKIAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 184 (“If utilities make investments in an R
environment of substantial uncertain cost recovery, their cost of capital may rise, exacerbat-
ing cost-recovery challenges.”).
128. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. R
129. See EDISON ELEC. INST., ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND RISK COMPENSATION 2 (2006), http://
www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/industrydataanalysis/industryfinancialanalysis/QtrlyFinan
cialUpdates/Documents/QFU_Credit/2014_Q2_Credit_Ratings.pdf (setting forth five fun-
damental postulates for defining utility risk); see also LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 35, at R
139–42 (describing the fundamental process of defining the fair rate of return for utility
investment and defining the cost of capital).
130. IPCC, supra note 94, at 28.
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and providing a more certain future for our health, our environment, and
future generations.”131
While the level of commitment to decarbonization by policymakers and
the public varies,132 utilities are increasingly reducing the carbon footprint
of their systems.133 Whether it is because of EPA’s Clean Power Plan, the
threat of future regulation, or simple economics, fossil fuel generating re-
sources are increasingly being replaced by renewable ones, and the system is
likely to see more pressure in this direction in the future.134
2. Distributed Energy Resources
Utilities and regulators agree that the future electric system will include
more distributed generating resources, which will have the benefits of in-
creasing resilience, reliability, and efficiency.135 On the generation side, a
transition to distributed renewables has the potential to mitigate or shift
peak demand, obviate the need for additional transmission infrastructure,
and address areas of transmission or generation constraint, as well as de-
crease carbon emissions.136 Modernized grid facilities will also facilitate the
collection and dissemination of granular usage data, allowing for develop-
ment of differentiated rates and high levels of personalized information for
customers.137
131. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 2
(2015), http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan (describ-
ing why the Clean Power Plan is needed).
132. At the state level, renewable resource portfolio targets vary from zero (no defined
renewable resource portfolio standards) to 75% by 2032 (Vermont) and 100% by 2045 (Ha-
waii). See DSIRE, supra note 48.
133. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. ENERGY-RELATED CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
2013, at 8 (2014), http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/pdf/2013_co2analysis
.pdf (attributing the decline in electric sector carbon intensity to an increase in renewable
resources, decline in coal-fired generation, and substitution of natural gas for coal).
134. See supra notes 106, 108, 112–14 and accompanying text; see also Commission’s Incli-
nations on the Future of Hawaii’s Electric Utilities, at 5, Exhibit A to Decision and Order, In
re Integrated Res. Planning, Docket No. 2012-0036, Order No. 32052 (Haw. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n Apr. 28, 2014), http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Decision-and-
Order-No.-32052.pdf (“[P]ursing a diverse portfolio of renewable energy resources provides
the best long-term strategy.”); REV Order, supra note 85, at 24 (stating a need to reduce
carbon emissions of electric generation, transportation, and building heating); AEEI, supra
note 2, at 3 (describing California’s “path to significant de-carbonization”). R
135. See, e.g., E21 INITIATIVE, supra note 5, at 4 (“The rapidly emerging modern grid looks R
much more distributed and decentralized.”); RMI, supra note 75, at 6 (“[T]he electricity R
system is shifting toward a future in which the deployment and operation of distributed
energy resources (DERs) will have far-reaching implications for grid operation, investment,
and security.”).
136. See Wiedman & Beach, supra note 7, at 89. R
137. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. R
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The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU), for example,
has instituted a proceeding devoted to creating a vision for a “modern elec-
tric system” that is primarily focused on planning for new grid technolo-
gies.138 Maryland’s Utility 2.0 Report concludes that “smart grid
information, analysis, control and savings” is a key category in which pro-
gress should occur.139 New York’s REV proceeding, a state initiative focused
on transforming the New York electric system to become more efficient,
less dependent on fossil fuels, and more responsive to customer needs, has
also focused heavily on distributed resources.140
3. Provision of New Customer Services
Customers, regulators, and utilities also agree that the utility of the
future will need to be more responsive to customer demands for alternative
services.141 Where in the past the utility sold kilowatt hours and provided
basic customer service related to that commodity, in the future utilities will
be asked to offer a variety of alternative services, including maintaining
customers’ privacy, and ensuring the security of customer and utility
data.142
4. Financial Stability
While it may be hyperbole to suggest that the financial stability of utili-
ties is in jeopardy, protection of the financial health and stability of utilities
must remain a central goal of the regulatory system. Beyond constitutional
requirements, the financial health of utilities directly impacts their ability to
accomplish the other goals on this list, particularly the transition to a decar-
bonized generation portfolio and increased investment in distribution infra-
structure.143 While financial stability does not always feature prominently
138. Investigation of Grid Modernization, supra note 5, at 2.
139. ENERGY FUTURE COAL., supra note 5, at 1.
140. See REV Order, supra note 85, at 11 (noting that distributed resources will become
“integral tools” in the new electric system).
141. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
142. See id; see also ENERGY FUTURE COAL., supra note 5, at 2–3, 21 (forecasting a need for R
increased responsiveness to customer demands, new demands for utility services, and a need
to adjust ratemaking accordingly); NADEL & HERNDON, supra note 8, at 48 (discussing calls for R
new utility services).
143. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CO M M’N., ELECTRIC UTILITY BUSINESS AND REGULATORY MODELS 11
(Jun. 8, 2015), http://cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/
Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work/PPDElectricUtilityBusinessMod
els.pdf (“The ability of the utilities to invest significant capital in the distribution grid is in
part a function of their ability to attract investors . . . . In turn, their ability to attract
investors is a function of their ability to provide a profit for shareholders.”).
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in the “utility of the future” discussions,144 it is an essential element of the
list of goals for the utility of the future.
5. Safe and Adequate Service at Reasonable Rates
The underlying mission of all utility regulation has always been the
provision of safe and adequate service at just and reasonable rates,145 and
this guideline principle is likely to remain a goal for the new utility
system.146
B. Establishing Priorities Among Competing Alternatives
In the past, key regulatory goals of low prices and adequate service
remained basically in alignment, thanks to increasing economies of scale.147
Today, however, the new utility goals may directly conflict with each other,
requiring an unfamiliar exercise in prioritization. Upgrading the utility grid
to allow for greater penetration of distributed resources may lead to in-
creased rates of decarbonization and greater resilience,148 but is likely to
also require significant investment that may drive up rates.149 How should
utility regulators view a choice between lower rates and more distributed
resources? If investment in renewable resources will drive up utility rates
but increase decarbonization, which is more important?
Currently, some jurisdictions use long-term planning processes to
weigh the costs and risks of new resources over an extended planning hori-
zon,150 and some include the potential cost of carbon and impact of new
environmental regulations in this analysis.151 But the utility planning pro-
144. Some of the new utility discussions do include some mention or discussion of the
financial health of the modern utility. For example, the Maryland proceeding has noted that
changes to the utility business model are necessary to keep the utility “financially viable”
even as it delivers less energy to customers. See ENERGY FUTURE COAL., supra note 5, at 1.
145. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. R
146. See Investigation of Grid Modernization, supra note 5 (describing one goal of the
modernized grid as providing customers with the ability to decrease bills); REV Order, supra
note 85, at 14 (noting that the New York Public Service Commission must meet existing
regulatory expectations as well as new environmental goals); E21 INITIATIVE, supra note 5, at 2 R
(including the guiding principles of providing “just, reasonable, and competitive rates”); Si-
oshansi, supra note 3, at 73–74 (describing the pressures of current market trends and how
they are likely to compel new utility business models).
147. See supra notes 18, 38–39, 51–53 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
150. These long-term planning processes generally produce what is known as an Inte-
grated Resource Plan (IRP). For a summary of state IRP rules, see WILSON & PETERSON, supra
note 46, at 2. See also Bertschi, supra note 46, at 832–34 (describing components of an IRP).
151. See Galen Barbose et al., Managing Carbon Regulatory Risk in Utility Resource Plan-
ning: Current Practices in the Western United States, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3300, 3301–03 (2008)
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cess will only become more complicated as new policy goals are created,
with benefits accruing to not just utility ratepayers, but to the entire planet.
In the absence of specific legislation prioritizing or requiring environ-
mental initiatives, utility regulators generally prioritize low rates and cost-
based benefits to ratepayers over attenuated benefits like reduced GHG
emissions.152 Without new legislation, economic concerns are likely to take
priority over new environmental goals, including decarbonizations and a
growth in distributed energy resources.
C. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking Meets the New Utility Goals
The utility regulatory system no longer enjoys the perfect confluence of
goals and incentives that it did prior to 1970.153 However, the lack of perfect
alignment does not necessarily signal an end to cost-based ratemaking. The
question is whether the incentives built into the current cost-based structure
work toward, or in opposition to, the evolving goals for the system.
Though one might expect this to be a complicated question, when it
comes to items one and two on the list of utility goals, it is actually rather
simple. The current cost-based regulatory system ties utility profits to capi-
tal investment.154 The growth of non-utility distributed generation re-
sources explicitly undermines the regulated monopoly enjoyed by the utility
and asks the utility to work against its own self-interest by helping to grow
its competitors.
To the extent that decarbonization includes an expansion of efficiency
and demand response programs (which detract from utility sales), or an
expansion of non-utility distributed generation, seeking these goals also
runs counter to embedded regulatory incentives.155 On the other hand, if
utilities are able to invest in distributed generation resources and earn a
(assessing and analyzing modeling of carbon regulations and emission pricing in selected
IRPs); Karl Bokenkamp et al., Hedging Carbon Risk: Protecting Customers and Shareholders from
the Financial Risk Associated with Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 18 ELECTRICITY J., July 2005, at 11,
15–17 (describing use of proxy cost for GHG emissions in planning processes).
152. See Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility Commissions
to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 400 (2014)
(“[T]he economic foundation of the regulatory structure demands that utilities demonstrate
customer-specific economic benefits for programs. . . . Because of this regulatory necessity,
public utility commissions simply cannot be expected to drive energy policy changes, en-
courage reductions in GHG emissions, or even drive significant technological evolution in
the utility system.”).
153. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. R
154. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the disincentives to utilities engaging in energy efficiency activ-
ities, see Inara Scott, “Dancing Backward in High Heels”: Examining and Addressing the Dispa-
rate Treatment of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Resources, 43 ENVTL. L. 255, 277–78 (2013).
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return on that investment, they would indeed have an incentive to build
distributed generation.
Goal three, the provision of new services, is new territory for utilities.
Historically, they have sold a commodity, and investor returns have come
from investing in the infrastructure that provides that commodity.156 To the
extent that new services are billed at cost-based rates, they do not contravene
existing regulatory incentives, but utilities have no incentive to build capac-
ity to provide such services.
Goal four is not new to the regulatory system, and utilities clearly have
an incentive to maintain their own financial stability. The question will be
whether new regulatory models will undermine this important goal for the
utility system by creating new regulatory risk for utility investors. Utilities
will seek to minimize regulatory risk, which may undermine new goals for
the extension of distributed resource infrastructure. Regulators will have to
balance the goal of keeping rates low with the constitutional requirement
that utilities have an opportunity to earn a fair return, consistent with the
level of risk in the industry.
Goal five, regarding rates and service, does not create any conflicting
incentives in and of itself. Given new market entrants, increasing competi-
tion, and the threat of the so-called death spiral, utilities today have a strong
interest in keeping rates reasonable.157 However, like regulators, utilities are
likely to find themselves torn between competing priorities for financial
returns to investors, low rates, and expansion of services.
In sum, the new utility goals either conflict with existing regulations, or
existing regulations make the utility indifferent to accomplishing the new
goals. The current regulatory structure provides no clear incentives for utili-
ties to accomplish the new goals. For a system that has long used regulatory
incentives to accomplish significant milestones in the growth of access to
utility services, this should be a sobering realization. The next obvious ques-
tion is: will proposals for a new regulatory structure create these incentives?
Part IV examines this question.
IV. ANALYZING ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY STRUCTURES AND
SETTING PRIORITIES
The potential conflict between the new utility goals and the existing
cost-based regulatory structure is not a surprise to anyone in the industry. A
number of independent and state-sponsored proceedings are currently in-
vestigating how to reshape utility regulation, either in a holistic way or in a
156. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. R
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targeted fashion to address distributed resource challenges and the need for
greater utility resilience.158 Think tanks and scholars have also offered pre-
scriptions for new utility regulation.159 However, not all of these sugges-
tions are equally well poised to address regulatory incentives embedded in
the existing model, and few appear to deliberately use regulatory incentives
to achieve the stated goals of the system. This Part reviews the most promi-
nent recommendations for new regulatory structures, and asks if they create
incentives for utilities to work toward the new goals of the regulatory sys-
tem, or if not, how to bring alignment to competing incentives. This Part
also considers whether any of the options provide a means for setting priori-
ties between competing goals.
158. See REV Order, supra note 85, at 3 (stating an overall objective of “ensuring that
New York meets and exceeds its targeted goals to reduce carbon emissions through energy
efficiency and clean power development in a manner that ensures grid reliability and resili-
ence while enhancing the value of the system for consumers”); E21 INITIATIVE, supra note 5, at R
ii (aiming to “develop a more customer-centric and sustainable framework for utility regula-
tion in Minnesota that better aligns how utilities earn revenue with public policy goals, new
customer expectations, and the changing technology landscape”); RMI, supra note 75, at 4 (a R
discussion paper intended to “support discussion and dialogue about next-generation retail
electricity pricing approaches”); AEEI, supra note 2 (exploring the future of the electric R
system in California). Hawaii’s PUC began a conversation about the future of its electric
utility system in a document it titled Inclinations on the Future of Hawaii’s Electric Utilities,
which is now playing out in the context of a proposed merger between NextEra Energy, a
Florida-based company, and the Hawaiian Electric Company. See Gov. Ige Explains Opposition
To Proposed Nextera-HECO Merger, KHON2 NEWS (July 21, 2015), http://khon2.com/2015/07/
21/gov-ige-explains-opposition-to-proposed-nextera-heco-merger/ (noting Governor Ige’s
opposition to the merger on the grounds that it would conflict with a 100% renewable energy
future). See generally Commission’s Inclinations on the Future of Hawaii’s Electric Utilities,
at 5, Exhibit A to Decision and Order, In re Integrated Res. Planning, Docket No. 2012-
0036, Order No. 32052 (Haw. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 28, 2014), http://puc.hawaii.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Decision-and-Order-No.-32052.pdf (“[P]ursing a diverse port-
folio of renewable energy resources provides the best long-term strategy.”). Meanwhile, Cali-
fornia, Massachusetts, and Maryland PUCs are all currently holding proceedings focused on
the evolution of the state’s grid and ability to accommodate distributed generation. See Van
Nostrand, supra note 2, at 164–70. R
159. See generally CHARLES GOLDMAN ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., UTILITY BUSI-
NESS MODELS IN A LOW LOAD GROWTH/HIGH DG FUTURE: GAZING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL? (2013)
(powerpoint slides); LEHR, supra note 71; NADEL & HERNDON, supra note 8; Sonia Aggarwal & R
Hal Harvey, Rethinking Policy to Deliver a Clean Energy Future, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 7, 11–12
(2013) (discussing high-level system goals and recommending the use of markets and per-
formance based regulation); Newcomb et al., supra note 88 (emphasizing a need for greater
cost-benefit analysis to level the playing field for new distributed generation resources);
Wiedman & Beach, supra note 7 (offering a variety of ratemaking tools to encourage the R
growth of distributed generation).
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A. Status Quo with Targeted “Fixes”
For those who do not want to radically change the existing regulatory
structure, a number of short-term adjustments to the current cost-based
ratemaking system have been suggested. While each attempts to address
some of the flaws of the current regulatory system, they are not generally
intended to create incentives for utilities to accomplish key goals. Rather,
they are intended to remove utility disincentives, and to create incentives
for customers to take actions.
1. Decoupling
Decoupling is a term given to mechanisms that address the sales-
throughput problem in utility regulation by compensating utilities for reve-
nues lost to energy conservation or efficiency programs.160 The sales-
throughput problem is created by the manner in which utility rates are cal-
culated. In a rate case, a cost of utility service is divided into fixed and
volumetric (per kilowatt-hour) charges, with a portion of the utility’s fixed
costs embedded in the volumetric charges.161 This practice drives up per-
unit charges, making the total bill more sensitive to conservation.162 How-
ever, it also means if the customer uses less energy than forecast, the utility
will under-recover its fixed charges, and vice versa, creating a clear incentive
for the utility to drive up sales.163
While decoupling is an important mechanism for mitigating the util-
ity’s incentive to increase sales, it is by no means perfect. One of the criti-
cisms of decoupling is that it creates a highly complex mechanism that can
be difficult for customers to understand.164 When one of the goals of the
160. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY,
ALIGNING UTILITY INCENTIVES WITH INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2-2 (2007), http://
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/napee_report.pdf (discussing the
throughput incentive). As of October 2013, 16 states had some form of decoupling mecha-
nism in place for electric utilities. See NADEL & HERNDON, supra note 8, at 26; see also R
Decoupling in Detail, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-
regions/policy-maps/decoupling/detail (last visited Apr. 2, 2016) (providing a description of
decoupling and link to maps showing states that have implemented decoupling policies).
161. See EPA, supra note 160, at 2-4 (suggesting increasing fixed charges to diminish
throughput incentive); Pamela G. Lesh, Rate Impacts and Key Design Elements of Gas and
Electric Utility Decoupling: A Comprehensive Review, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 65, 66–67 (describing the
manner of recovery for utility fixed charges).
162. See Lesh, supra note 161, at 66 (noting that changes to traditional rate design can
diminish conservation incentives and shift costs to different customer classes).
163. See EPA, supra note 160.
164. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULATION AND DECOUPLING: A GUIDE
TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 51 (2011), www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_RevenueRegulationand
Decoupling_2011_04.pdf (describing the complexity of utility bills and the challenges of
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new utility system is to encourage greater customer engagement and trans-
parency, this is a significant concern.
The other problem with decoupling is that it, at best, only removes the
disincentive for the utility to engage in energy efficiency. It does nothing to
mitigate the utility’s incentive to invest in new generation facilities.165
While the utility may become indifferent to losses associated with effi-
ciency, it retains a strong incentive to add generation facilities in order to
increase rate base. Thus, decoupling does not level the playing field be-
tween efficiency and new generation, let alone create any kind of incentive
for utilities to engage in energy efficiency programs.
2. Net Metering and Increased Fixed Charges
Net metering programs are widely used to compensate distributed gen-
eration customers for the amount of electricity they generate.166 Net meter-
ing works by offsetting the customer’s bill based on the amount of energy
the customer generates167 and is generally considered a strong incentive for
household solar installations.168 One problem created by net metering is
communicating about decoupling); Lesh, supra note 161, at 70–71 (listing different features
of decoupling mechanisms and noting the complexity and difficulty of identifying
decoupling policies).
165. See SARA HAYES ET AL., AM . COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., CARROTS FOR
UTILITIES: PROVIDING FINANCIAL RETURNS FOR UTILITY INVESTMENTS IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 1–2
(2011), http://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/U111.pdf (iden-
tifying both the disincentive to investment and the lack of a positive incentive to engage in
energy efficiency programming).
166. See DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY (DSIRE) ET AL.,
NET METERING (2015), http://www.dsireusa.org/resources/detailed-summary-maps/net-meter-
ing-policies/ (showing that 44 states plus the District of Columbia had net metering policies
in place as of March 2015); see also N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. & MEISTER CONSULTANTS
GRP., THE 50 STATES OF SOLAR: A QUARTERLY LOOK AT AMERICA’S FAST-EVOLVING DISTRIBUTED
SOLAR POLICY CONVERSATION 8–15 (2015), http://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/50-
States-of-Solar-Issue2-Q2-2015-FINAL3.pdf (providing detailed updates to net metering
policies on a state-by-state basis).
167. See VAUGHN NELSON, INTRODUCTION TO RENEWABLE ENERGY 305 (2011) (briefly
describing net metering); PUB. UTIL . CO M M’N OF OR ., INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF SOLAR PROGRAMS IN OREGON 5–6 (2014), http://www.puc.state.or.us/electric_gas/Investiga-
tion%20into%20the%20Effectiveness%20of%20Solar%20Programs%20in%20Oregon%20
2014.pdf (describing Oregon’s net metering program).
168. ANDREW SATCHWELL ET AL., FINANCIAL IMPACTS OF NET-METERED PV ON UTILITIES
AND RATEPAYERS: A SCOPING STUDY OF TWO PROTOTYPICAL U.S. UTILITIES 1 (2014), https://
emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-6913e.pdf (noting that net metering has been a “critical ele-
ment in the value proposition” of residential solar PV systems). For a copy of the report, as
well as links to a presentation, webinar, and national news coverage, see Lawrence Berkeley
Nat’l Lab., Financial Impacts of Net-Metered PV on Utilities and Ratepayers: A Scoping Study of
Two Prototypical U.S. Utilities, ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND POLICY GROUP, https://emp.lbl.gov/
publications/financial-impacts-net-metered-pv (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).
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similar to that created by energy efficiency: utilities recover a portion of
their fixed charges in volumetric rates, so when distributed generation cus-
tomers offset their usage, they also offset a portion of their fixed charges,
leading to a decline in the returns earned by utilities169 and a shifting of
those costs to other utility customers.170
A final problem is that customers are compensated by offsetting a por-
tion of their usage, which is charged at a retail rate, with energy that would
more appropriately be classified as wholesale energy.171 Thus, the customer
is arguably compensated in excess of the value of the energy they gener-
ate.172 An additional problem, of course, is that distributed generation facili-
ties owned by customers present a competitive threat to utilities.173
To address these concerns and account for lost revenues, a number of
utilities have suggested increasing fixed charges, either to all customers or
only to net metering customers. However, complicating matters is the fact
that actual fixed costs incurred in serving residential utility customers has
always been in some dispute.174 Things get even more complicated when
assessing fixed charges for owners of distributed generation resources. Resi-
dential solar customers require access to utility grid management services,
which creates new costs, while still needing access to the standard distribu-
169. The extent to which utility revenues decline due to net metering and solar penetra-
tion has been the subject of increasing attention by policy analysts and PUCs. A 2014 study
conducted at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found that impact to shareholder
earnings ranged from 4% to 15%, depending on the total penetration of solar into the market,
and the utility studied (either a prototypical southwestern utility or prototypical northeast-
ern utility). See SATCHWELL ET AL., supra note 168, at ix (summarizing impact on achieved
earnings); see also Blackburn, supra note 84, at 20 (describing under-recovery of fixed costs
due to net metering).
170. PUB. UTIL . CO M M’N OF OR ., supra note 167, at iv (“Under net metering programs,
solar users may not pay for their share of fixed costs of the generation, transmission, and
distribution services embedded in electricity rates.”).
171. See EDISON ELEC. INST., STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT NET METERING 2–3 (2013) (explaining
difference between wholesale and retail rates).
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., Graffy & Kihm, supra note 2, at 12 (arguing that distributed solar is illus-
trative of innovations that will “catalyze unpredictable forms of disruptive competition for
utilities”); Jeff McMahon, Four Ways The Solar Boom Has Rattled Utilities, FORBES (Sept. 23,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2013/09/23/four-ways-the-solar-boom-has-
rattled-utilities/ (describing the competitive threat posed by solar). But see Raskin, supra note
70, at 266–67 (arguing that distributed generation does not present a realistic competitive
threat to regulated utility service).
174. While meter reading and billing are generally agreed upon as fixed charges, the
extent to which customers should be billed a fixed charge for, inter alia, basic distribution
facilities remains in significant debate. See JIM LAZAR, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER
CHARGES AND MINIMUM BILLS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR RECOVERING BASIC DISTRIBUTION
COSTS 1 (2014), www.raponline.org/document/download/id/7361.
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tion infrastructure, billing, and customer service.175 On the other hand, dis-
tributed resources may allow utilities to delay adding new generation,
reduce transmission losses, avoid adding new transmission, and hedge
against variable fuel costs associated with fossil fuel resources.176
Contentious proceedings over raising fixed charges have also focused on
(1) the need for more accurate valuation of the costs and benefits of residen-
tial solar resources; (2) the burden rate increases place on lower income
customers; (3) the equity of raising fixed charges after customers have in-
vested in a solar photovoltaic (PV) installation; and (4) the potential soften-
ing of incentives for customers to invest in distributed resources and energy
efficiency.177 Others have worried that increasing fixed charges will exacer-
bate the utility “death cycle” by increasing the incentive for customers with
distributed generation resources to leave the system.178
Some jurisdictions have been trying to sort out these issues by develop-
ing an alternative to net metering that would compensate residential solar
owners based on the value of the energy they generate.179 These “value of
175. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CO M M’N, CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING RATEPAYER IMPACTS
EVALUATION 86 (2013), https://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/state_local_governments/blog/
weighing-the-costs-and-benefits-of-net-metering-and-distributed-solar.
176. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE (RMI), A REVIEW OF SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST STUD-
IES 12–18 (2013), http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center%2FLibrary%2F2013-13_eLabDER
CostValue (summarizing cost and benefit categories, but noting that an individual factor may
be a cost or a benefit, depending on the perspective of the stakeholder in question); see also
PUB. UTIL . CO M M’N OF OR ., supra note 167, at 19–22.
177. See Blackburn, supra note 84, at 20–22 (discussing controversy over the costs and
benefits of net metering); Thomas Content, State Regulators Approve 83% Increase in Green
Bay Utility’s Fixed Charge, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.jsonline
.com/business/state-regulators-approve-83-in-green-bay-utilitys-fixed-charge-b99385986z1-
281824701.html (noting that increased fixed charges would hurt low income residents and
negatively impact small business’ conservation efforts); Ian Clover, Utah Rejects Net Metering
Charge, PV MAG. (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/utah-
rejects-net-metering-fee_100016309/#axzz3ESovBLJm (quoting advocates of renewable en-
ergy who argued that increasing the fixed charge would punish individuals who had already
invested in solar); see, e.g., Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures &
Rules for the California Solar Initiative, the Self-Generation Incentive Program & Other
Distributed Generation Issues, No. 12-11-005, 2014 WL 1390905, at *1 (Cal. P.U.C. Mar. 27,
2014) (discussing the costs of residential solar and imposing a tariff); In re Idaho Power Co.’s
Application for Auth. to Modify Its Net Metering Serv. & to Increase the Generation Ca-
pacity Limit, No. IPC-E-12-27, 2013 WL 3377126, at *2 (Idaho P.U.C. July 3, 2013).
178. See Blackburn, supra note 84, at 20.
179. See, e.g., In re Establishing a Distributed Solar Value Methodology Under Minn.
Stat. § 216b.164, Subd. 10 (e) & (f), Order Approving Distributed Solar Value Methodol-
ogy, No. E-999/M-14-65, 2014 WL 1347985, at *1 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 1, 2014) (implement-
ing a value of solar methodology that “should compensate solar PV customers in a way that
does not advantage or disadvantage them relative to other customers or other forms of
generation”).
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solar” proceedings would leave intact current volumetric rate structures and
fixed charges in an effort not to dull conservation incentives but would
more accurately calculate the cost of providing grid services to distributed
generation customers and the benefits of the energy they provide to the
utility.180 When distributed generation customers offset their consumption,
they would do so at this separately calculated rate, rather than the standard
retail rate.181
However, even when using a value of solar approach, if existing utility
incentives for investment in generation facilities are left intact—as they usu-
ally are—the utility still suffers a lost opportunity to earn profits when non-
utility distributed generation facilities are built.
This fact has not been lost on the public, which has accused utilities of
trying to block the growth of residential solar.182 Utilities have pointed to
the loss of fixed charges to explain their concerns, noting that the current
system socializes costs from residential solar owners to those for whom solar
is not practical, feasible, or affordable.183 While net metering may have pre-
cisely this effect, the problem of competition, regulatory incentives, and the
loss of status as monopoly provider is just as, if not more, important to
understanding the utility’s actions. Until this issue is resolved, utilities will
continue to stand as an obstacle to the growth of distributed generation and
rooftop solar—not because they are populated by bad actors who want to
perpetuate climate change, but because they are for-profit entities and can-
not be expected to operate against their own self-interest.
3. Differentiated Rates
Another regulatory mechanism that has been proposed is the creation of
differentiated rates, which attempt to more closely track the charges associ-
ated with the provision of electricity at specific times or in specific loca-
tions.184 These programs are primarily intended to give customers more
180. See id. at *6–7.
181. See id. at *17.
182. See Elizabeth Daigneau, Renewable Energy’s Rise Hurting Utilities, GOVERNING THE
STATES & LOCALITIES (Nov. 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infra-
structure/gov-renewable-energy-rise-hurts-utilities.html (arguing that net metering is “eating
into” utility profits, and as a result, utilities are pushing back); see also Clover, supra note 177;
Rossetti & Florence, supra note 12; Voorhees, supra note 12. R
183. See, e.g., Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures & Rules for
the California Solar Initiative, the Self-Generation Incentive Program & Other Distributed
Generation Issues, No. 12-11-005, 2014 WL 1390905, at *1, *6 (Cal. P.U.C. Mar. 27, 2014).
184. A variety of differentiated rate proposals were presented in a 2014 report by the
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI). See RMI, supra note 75, at 20–29. R
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accurate price signals and allow them to benefit from shifting their usage,185
a goal that is consistent with efforts to strengthen customer engagement,
provide more transparency in ratemaking, and create incentives to shift cus-
tomer demand.186 Differentiated rates are also intended to support the
growth of distributed generation.187
It is important to note that differentiated rate schedules would provide
incentives for customers to pursue distributed generation and shift demand.
As with other targeted “fixes,” however, none of these differentiated rates
provide incentives for utilities to pursue the new goals for the electric power
system.
B. Shifting the Value Proposition
A number of proceedings have suggested fundamental changes to the
basic value proposition of the electric utility in light of current market
trends and changes to the utility sector. Two such proposals are discussed
below: a move away from the traditionally vertically integrated utility to a
distribution system platform, and a change from the utility as a commodity
provider to that of a service provider.
1. Utility as Distributed System Platform
One significant regulatory change proposed in several of the major pro-
ceedings around the future of the utility system is to shift the utility’s value
proposition from providing vertically integrated sales of an electric com-
modity to becoming the manager for an upgraded distribution system that
will include significant new distributed resources, including storage, electric
vehicles, microgrids, and renewable resources.188
New York’s REV proceeding recently reached this conclusion, ordering
that in the future the utility would play the role of a Distributed System
185. Id. at 7–8, 10, 26 (setting forth benefits to customers and ways to engage customers
in shifting use).
186. See supra Subsections III.A.1–3.
187. RMI, supra note 75, at 10, 15–18 (describing how differentiated rates are both nec- R
essary for and supportive of distributed energy resource development); see also JIM LAZAR &
WILSON GONZALEZ, SMART RATE DESIGN FOR A SMART FUTURE 61 (2015), www.raponline.org/
document/download/id/7680 (“Realization of the potential benefits of DER [distributed en-
ergy resources] requires TOU/CPP [time of use/critical peak pricing] or PTR [peak time
rebate] rate design.”).
188. Investigation of Grid Modernization, supra note 5 (holding that electric distribution
companies have the responsibility for certain aspects of grid modernization, including inte-
grating distributed resources and optimizing demand); REV Order, supra note 85, at 12;
ENERGY FUTURE COAL., supra note 5, at 2–3 (describing functions for the electric utility of the R
future, which include assisting customers in optimizing use, access to alternative energy sup-
pliers, and system optimization).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA201.txt unknown Seq: 41 18-MAY-16 13:25
Spring 2016] Incentive Regulation 359
Platform (DSP), which would be responsible for the reliability of the grid,
but would also integrate distributed energy resources from a variety of mar-
ket players, including energy service companies and retail suppliers; act as
the interface between customers and service providers; and optimize the
system components from transmission to central generation or large-scale
renewable resources.189
Jon Wellinghoff, former chair of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC), has proposed to take the DSP plan a step further.190 He
advocates turning utility distribution assets over to an independent distribu-
tion system operator (IDSO) in order to ensure that utility ownership of
distribution resources does not create a conflict of interest in the operation
of the system.191 Wellinghoff further suggests that the IDSO model offers
greater integration of resources across utility service territories and greater
efficiency.192
The primary benefit of an IDSO or DSP model is that it would focus
utility attention on managing an advanced grid focused around distributed
resources and clarify the utility’s role in advancing distributed infrastruc-
ture.193 Given the new goals for decarbonization and the growth of distrib-
uted resources, this seems like a necessary step in the evolution of the
utility system. However, neither the IDSO nor DSP mechanism, on its own,
will create utility incentives to further these goals.
As the New York PSC itself notes,
Reforming the Commission’s current ratemaking practices will be
critical to the success of the REV vision. Under current ratemaking,
utilities have little or no incentive to enable markets and third par-
ties in creating value for customers. Rather, utilities’ earnings are
tied primarily to their ability to increase their own capital invest-
ments, and secondarily to their ability to cut operating costs, even
at the expense of creating value.194
189. REV Order, supra note 85, at 12.
190. See James Tong & Jon Wellinghoff, Rooftop Parity: Solar for Everyone, Including Utili-
ties, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2014, at 18, 19 (arguing on behalf of an independent distribution
operator); Herman K. Trabish, Jon Wellinghoff: Utilities Should Not Operate the Distribution
Grid, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/jon-wellinghoff-utilities
-should-not-operate-the-distribution-grid/298286/.
191. Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 190, at 20.
192. Id.
193. “Under the construct we are establishing . . . the development and support of
[distributed energy resources] becomes a core component of traditional utility service. In-
deed, one of the foundational elements of REV is to make clean energy and energy efficiency
integral rather than ancillary to basic system planning and operations.” Id. at 48.
194. REV Order, supra note 85, at 12–13.
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The PSC has stated an intention to address these issues in a second track of
the REV proceeding.195
Some proponents of a DSP or IDSO model have also called for restric-
tions on the utility’s ability to own distributed resources.196 The argument
is that as long as the utility is able to invest in distributed resources, it will
use its market power to block the development of non-utility resources,
which will ultimately slow the development of the market and transition to
a distributed resource future.197
While this argument is reasonable, it ignores a few key points. First,
preventing the utility from owning distributed generation doesn’t solve the
conflict of interest problem—as long as the utility owns any form of genera-
tion, it will have an incentive to block the development of non-utility re-
sources, distributed or central plant. Second, this desire to block the utility
from the distributed generation market may actually slow the transition to a
distributed generation future by making distributed resources more
expensive.
Utilities have access to low-cost capital precisely because of the low risk
profile of their investments and their position as monopoly providers under
the regulatory compact.198 Allowing utilities to aggregate and invest in dis-
tributed resources could lower the cost of these resources to participants.
Utilities may also be able to utilize owned resources more efficiently. For
example, if a utility funds a solar or storage application, it can develop those
resources in a manner that meets existing demand, reduces hot spots, and
shaves peak loads, something an individual customer may not be able or
incentivized to do.199
Another solution to this problem would be a modification of the gener-
ally accepted method of calculating the utility’s rate base. One approach,
195. Id.
196. As the New York PSC noted in its REV Order, “[Distributed energy resource]
ownership is one of the most contentious issues in the REV proceeding.” Id. at 66.
197. For this reason, the New York PSC concluded that utility ownership of distributed
energy resources would be, “the exception rather than the rule.” Id.
198. CAL. PUB. UTILS . CO M M’N., ELECTRIC UTILITY BUSINESS AND REGULATORY MODELS 7
(2015), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/929E2B29-F72F-4BBD-9CD1-2C06DF2497
85/0/PPDElectricUtilityBusinessModels.pdf (noting that a smaller sales base due to attrition
to alternative generation sources, “may increase the investment risk profile of the utility . . . .
While many argue that risk is not inherently bad, a higher risk profile may lead to higher
costs of capital and may be seen as a deterrent to the traditional low-risk seeking utility
investor”); Clive J. Stones, Risk Sharing, the Cost of Equity, and the Optimal Capital Structure of
the Regulated Firm, 30 REV. INDUS. ORG . 139, 140 (2007) (asserting that rate-of-return regula-
tion implies lower risk to the utility, which in turn leads to a lower cost of capital).
199. RMI, supra note 75, at 15 (contrasting the customer individual interest in rooftop R
solar orientation, which is to maximize total production, and the utility’s interest, which is to
maximize system value).
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known as total expenditure accounting (TOTEX)200 includes both tradi-
tional invested capital and certain long-term operating expenses, such as
long-term contracts, in rate base.201 Another option, similar to TOTEX,
would allow the utility to earn a rate of return on assets that it manages.
This way, a utility DSP or services utility could establish long-term con-
tracts for distributed energy resources or distribution infrastructure (for ex-
ample, a microgrid) that the utility would manage as part of the system,
while ownership of the asset would be retained by a private party.202 The
benefit of these accounting mechanisms is that they would remove the in-
centive for the utility to favor its own generation or distribution facilities,
but would retain the overall incentive for utility investment in its system.
Ultimately, the DSP model, which offers a truly different model for the
“utility of the future,” does not provide any direct incentive for utilities to
work toward the transition to a renewable, energy efficient, distributed re-
source future. As the New York PSC recognized, key ratemaking structures
must be reconsidered in order to build the kind of regulatory incentives that
will make this transition a reality.
2. Utility as Service Provider
Another popular option for the structure of the “utility of the future” is
the utility as a service provider.203 In this structure, the utility is seen as
providing services, such as lighting, heating, electric car charging, or
microgrid support, rather than a commodity.
There are significant benefits to this type of proposal, the first being
that the utility would see a clear incentive to create efficiencies. For exam-
ple, imagine that a homeowner using traditional incandescent lightbulbs
pays $10 per month for lighting services. If the utility provided the home-
owner with high-efficiency LED bulbs, so the customer used less energy
but was charged the same rate, the utility could earn an additional profit—at
least until the next rate case, when the rate would presumably be adjusted.
To increase the conservation incentive, the utility might also be allowed to
earn a return on the investment of purchasing thousands of LED lightbulbs
200. TOTEX, which is used in the United Kingdom for electric and gas distribution
companies, stands for total expenditure accounting. See AEEI, supra note 2, at 32. R
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. See FOX-PENNER, supra note 7, at 189–202 (proposing the mission of the energy R
services utility as “provid[ing] lowest-cost energy services to its customers—light, heat, cool-
ing, computer-hours, and the dozens of other things we get from power every day”); LEHR,
supra note 71, at 18–19 (presenting the “energy services utility” as the maximum role for the R
utility of the future); NADEL & HERNDON, supra note 8, at 55–56 (describing a variety of R
proposals for the utility as service provider).
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for its customers, while incurring fewer costs because of the long-term effi-
ciencies of the LED bulbs.
Another benefit of this structure is that it would be explicitly organized
around one of the new goals of the utility system—providing customers
with services beyond the provision of kWh. A model for lighting and heat-
ing service could easily be expanded to create new services, such as individ-
ual data access, or grid services to stabilize distributed resources.
The appropriate ratemaking structure for the services utility is not gen-
erally discussed alongside proposals to transform the utility into a service
provider. However, if the system was to remain cost-based, utility profits
would, in some way, have to follow from the provision of services. For
example, investments used to serve customers might be valued in a rate case
and rates calculated as a percentage of total system load dedicated to a par-
ticular service.
While a service-based structure could incentivize utilities to seek effi-
ciencies between rate cases, it could also create an uneasy mixed incentive
for managers. Peter Fox-Penner characterizes the predicament as putting
utilities into “two diametrically opposed businesses, one selling their tradi-
tional product and one helping customers buy less of it.”204 A solution to
this problem would be to use a cost-based rate system for some utility ser-
vices (like distribution services and grid access) and a performance-based
rate system for others (such as lighting and heating).
The utility as service provider, like the utility as DSP or IDSO, is an
intriguing model for a distributed, decarbonized future. It also disrupts the
sales-throughput incentive and has potential to disrupt utility incentives for
investing in new generation resources. However, the extent to which it le-
verages regulatory incentives depends on the ratemaking structures that are
developed to support it.
C. Performance Incentives
Performance incentives tie utility compensation to the achievement of
certain performance-related metrics.205 For example, a utility might receive
204. FOX-PENNER, supra note 7, at 198. R
205. See SONIA AGGARWAL & EDDIE BURGESS, NEW REGULATORY MODELS 4 (2014), http://
americaspowerplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/NewRegulatoryModels.pdf (defining
performance-based ratemaking and contrasting it with traditional ratemaking); MELISSA
WHITED ET AL., UTILITY PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE MECHANISMS: A HANDBOOK FOR REGULATORS 1–2
(2015), http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incen
tive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf (listing advantages and potential pitfalls of perform-
ance incentive mechanisms). For an overview of incentive regulation, see generally Paul L.
Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(1986).
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an incentive for achievement of a particular reliability standard or amount
of energy efficiency obtained.206 The incentives this system creates are rela-
tively transparent as they are directly tied to the metric, the level of reward,
and the manner in which the utility achieves the reward.207
Performance-based ratemaking (PBR), a form of performance incentive,
was initially introduced to U.S. utilities in the 1980s as a means of limiting
costs and incentives for “gold plating”208 utility systems, and to integrate
with efforts at deregulation.209 PBR, also called “alternative regulation” is
often implemented as a replacement for traditional cost-of-service ratemak-
ing210 and may be paired with price caps, rate freezes, and cost trackers
between rate cases.211
Performance incentives may be calculated in a number of ways. In the
area of energy efficiency, utilities may be compensated through a share of
the net benefits achieved by efficiency programs or by fixed dollar amounts
related to the amount of energy savings achieved.212 To ensure efficient
overall operation of the utility system, some have proposed a model in
which compensation is tied to effective utilization of capital investments.213
A number of challenges threaten the straightforward effectiveness of
performance incentives and PBR. First, regulators must design achievable
metrics that are objective, clearly defined, and within the utility’s control. A
poorly designed performance incentive may be worse than no incentive at
all, as it could have the result of driving up costs without improved re-
sults.214 Moreover, until utility investors gain certainty in the method of
assessment and the utility’s ability to meet the metrics is established, the
perceived risk related to utility investments may rise, driving up the utility’s
cost of capital.215
206. Twenty-seven states currently have performance incentives for energy efficiency
programs at electric utilities. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 8, at 7. R
207. See WHITED ET AL., supra note 205, at 1.
208. Gold plating is a term commonly used in the utility industry to refer to a practice
of over-investment in capital assets in order to increase a utility’s rate base.
209. WHITED ET AL., supra note 205, at 12; see also Peter Navarro, The Simple Analytics of
Performance-Based Ratemaking: A Guide for the PBR Regulator, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 105, 107–09
(1996) (discussing early history and goals of PBR).
210. WHITED ET AL., supra note 205, at 12–13.
211. Id.
212. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 8, at 4–5. R
213. AEEI, supra note 2, at 33 (proposing a model in which an index of capital utiliza- R
tion would be developed to measure the utility’s overall performance at providing services
relative to the utility’s overall investment related to those services).
214. See WHITED ET AL., supra note 205, at 2.
215. See Aggarwal & Harvey, supra note 159, at 19.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA201.txt unknown Seq: 46 18-MAY-16 13:25
364 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:2
While a number of jurisdictions experimented with PBR in the 1990s,
just as they experimented with deregulation, many ultimately returned to
cost-based rates as a primary ratemaking structure, just as they backed away
from deregulation. Performance incentives are still widely used for energy
efficiency programs.216 At a minimum, performance-based goals for effi-
ciency or distributed resource growth could be paired with decoupling, dif-
ferentiated cost-of-service rates, and/or a transition to a DSP system in
order to provide the incentives lacking in these other structures.
V. PRIORITIZATION AND UTILITY GOALS
When it comes to prioritizing the new utility goals, many would prefer
to assume that regulators can “do it all”—decarbonize the system, shift to
new distributed resources and infrastructure, and enhance individual access
to data, all while keeping the system reliable and rates low.217
In some cases, this may be true. Estimates of available cost-effective
energy efficiency suggest that rates need not increase to reduce the need for
new supply-side resources.218 The costs for storage, renewable, and distrib-
uted resources continue to fall, reaching parity in many instances with fossil
fuel alternatives.219 Investing in smart grid and distributed infrastructure
has been shown to have significant cost benefits and can improve
reliability.220
However, to be clear, there are other costs that rarely make the head-
lines, including the trillions of dollars of investment in transmission and
distribution that are necessary in order to make the distributed resource
transition.221 The U.S. utility system is in serious need of investment, even
in the absence of any new goals for decarbonization, and the possibility that
these investments can be absorbed without any new rate increases is un-
likely, at best.222
216. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 8, at 7 (reporting 27 states have performance incentives for R
electric energy efficiency and 16 for natural gas efficiency).
217. President Obama calls his energy policy an “all-of-the-above” strategy that includes
renewable energy, economic growth, and a continued role for fossil fuels. See Jason Furman
& Jim Stock, New Report: The All-of-the-Above Energy Strategy as a Path to Sustainable Eco-
nomic Growth, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 29, 2014, 11:30 AM), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/blog/2014/05/29/new-report-all-above-energy-strategy-path-sustainable-economic-
growth. For a critique of this approach, see Trip Van Noppen, The Problem With an All of the
Above Energy Policy, EARTHJUSTICE BLOG (Jan. 16, 2014), http://earthjustice.org/blog/2014-janu
ary/the-problem-with-an-all-of-the-above-energy-policy.
218. See supra notes 49, 109–10 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
221. See 1 NREL, supra note 86, at xl.
222. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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There are several ways for regulators and policymakers to prioritize
utility goals.223 The most straightforward is to pair new regulatory initia-
tives with legislation that provides explicit targets for the utility system,
such as a renewable portfolio standard.224 A legislative directive avoids the
need for prioritization, forcing utilities and regulators to accomplish the
mandate regardless of any unintended consequences that may arise. A key
drawback of this system is the lack of flexibility. Utilities and regulators
cannot consider the utility system as a whole or trade off competing inter-
ests for the sake of overall efficiency or carbon reduction.225
Another option is for regulators to adopt comprehensive, long-term re-
source planning processes that include an analysis of cost and risk over an
extended time horizon (20–30 years). This type of process can steer utilities
and regulators away from short-term solutions and highlight risks related to
carbon regulation, resilience and reliability, and long-term fuel costs.226
However, it is important to understand that long-term planning processes
still require a policy determination of the goals the portfolio is intended to
meet.
In New York State, the REV process has offered an alternative model
for a comprehensive energy planning process. The REV proceeding, which
was launched by Governor Andrew Cuomo, integrates a number of differ-
ent legislative and regulatory initiatives, including resilience planning to
address the effects of climate change, the multistate Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI), and state efforts to reduce carbon emissions.227 The
New York Public Service Commission (PSC) has also been found by its
state courts to have wide discretion to enact regulatory programs that en-
courage “economy, efficiency, and care for the public safety, the preserva-
tion of environmental values and the conservation of natural resources.”228
223. See Scott, supra note 152, at 400–12.
224. For a basic description of renewable portfolio standards and helpful links, see gen-
erally Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.
gov/tech_deployment/state_local_governments/basics_portfolio_standards.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2016).
225. Scott, supra note 152, at 405.
226. BINZ ET AL., supra note 110, at 14–17 (ranking electric generation resources on the
basis of cost and risk).
227. See REV Order, supra note 85, at 2–3.
228. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 5(2) (McKinney 2011); see, e.g., Multiple Intervenors v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 154 A.D.2d 76, 79–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (“In determining
rate design, as in other ratemaking decisions, respondent’s expertise requires judicial defer-
ence to the weight the agency assigns to any given factor in the evidence before it.”); Abrams
v. Public Service Commission of New York, 492 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (N.Y. 1986) (“[U]nless it
is shown that the judgment of the PSC was exercised ‘without any rational basis or without
any reasonable support in the record’, [sic] its determination is not to be set aside.”).
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The overall goal of REV thus combines environmental and energy goals,
and allows regulators discretion in the goals they pursue.229
Although the REV Order articulates a number of priorities—including
universal, affordable service230—it does not attempt to order them. Nor has
the PSC bowed to pressure from various groups to engage in an explicit,
quantified benefit-costs analysis as part of the adoption of the REV frame-
work.231 Instead, the PSC suggests a sort of retroactive, or perhaps even
circular, benefit-cost assessment of the REV framework, based on the suc-
cess in achieving the (unordered) REV priorities and based on achievement
of performance-based ratemaking metrics yet to be established.232 In sum,
the PSC appears to be giving itself plenty of leeway to forge its own path,
and this may be essential to addressing the complex and shifting markets
forces and technological changes in the electric power sector. On the other
hand, the total discretion enjoyed by the PUC and the lack of any explicit
prioritization in the proceedings makes it difficult to know how the vision
will be implemented. New York’s unique statutory scheme, including ex-
isting efficiency and decarbonization programs, and the precedent allowing
the PUC to act outside of the traditional utility space make it difficult to
use the REV as a model for other proceedings.
229. REV Order, supra note 85, at 11. While some have argued that public utility com-
missions have implied authority to address environmental impacts as part of a general duty
to regulate in the “public interest,” I have argued in a previous article that both legal prece-
dent and tradition have left the majority of commissions to conclude that they lack the
authority to enact policies for environmental purposes. See Scott, supra note 152, at 400; c.f.
Jeremy Knee, Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental Impacts and the ‘Public Interest’, 113
W. VA. L. REV. 739, 744 (2011) (arguing that public utility commissions must consider envi-
ronmental impacts as part of their duty to regulate in the public interest). As of 2006, only
fifteen state commissions had explicit authority to consider environmental impacts in their
decisionmaking. Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility
Commissions, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–19 (2006). Even when the commission does have such
explicit authority, it may be discretionary, and may be interpreted as a lower-priority consid-
eration that must yield to issues of cost or reliability. See Scott, supra note 152, at 407–08.
230. REV Order, supra note 85, at 29.
231. REV is a long-term, far-reaching initiative that will eventually touch most
parts of the utilities’ infrastructure and business practices. An attempt to project a
quantified analysis onto the wide-ranging set of potential benefits in a REV ap-
proach, against hypothetical future cost scenarios under both REV and conven-
tional approaches, would be artificial and counter-productive. Id. at 120.
232. Although a predetermined BCA for the entire REV framework is not practi-
cal, active monitoring and review will be performed. Ongoing evaluation of the
progress in achieving REV priorities will be important in guiding implementation
decisions and measuring success. Metrics for evaluating REV in general will be
closely related to metrics used for performance-based ratemaking of utilities,
which will be developed in subsequent phases of this proceeding as well as in rate
proceedings. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This review of the most popular regulatory alternatives for Utility 2.0
reveals that few of the options utilize regulatory incentives to encourage
utilities to pursue the key goals for the modernized system. Differentiated
rate structures and targeted fixes such as decoupling provide some incen-
tives for customers to pursue goals that will benefit the utility system, and
can make utilities indifferent to customers engaging in efficiency or demand
response programs, but the utilities themselves gain little incentive to pur-
sue the new utility goals. Proposals to shift the value proposition of the
utility hold promise as a means of more efficiently managing demands for
new services and distributed resources, but still fail to provide utilities with
incentives for pursuing the new goals.
If old regulatory incentives are left intact, utilities in these new systems
may actually be saddled with conflicting incentives to seek profits based on
the addition of conventional generation and high usage rates and meet pol-
icy goals calling for new distributed resources and increased conservation.
None of the proposals examined provide any clear regulatory incentive for
utilities to pursue decarbonization, despite the significant need for invest-
ment in renewable generation and distributed resource infrastructure to
support this systemic transformation. In addition, many of the new propos-
als fail to directly address the need for financial security, leaving utilities
vulnerable to financial stress and potentially undermining goals for decar-
bonization and distributed resources.
After considering these potential areas of conflict, or missed opportuni-
ties for incentivizing utilities to meet policy goals, I conclude with the fol-
lowing recommendations for change to the utility regulatory structure:
First: Consider Retaining Cost-of-Service Ratemaking to Incentivize
Utility Investment in Distributed Energy Resources.
Cost-of-service ratemaking creates a powerful incentive for utilities to
engage in capital investment and provides significant reassurance to inves-
tors that they will receive a fair return on their investment. While a fee-for-
services or performance-based model could create the proper incentives for
effective operation and management of a distribution grid, it may be diffi-
cult to structure such a model in a way that also provides significant incen-
tives for capital investment. It therefore appears premature to turn away
completely from a cost-based system at this time, particularly with regard to
distribution infrastructure.
For this reason, I would recommend retaining cost-of-service ratemak-
ing, in order to incentivize utility investment in the infrastructure necessary
to support distributed resources. However, I would also recommend that
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the method of calculating rate base be modified to allow the utility to in-
clude long-term operating expenses and assets under long-term manage-
ment. This modification would create an incentive for utilities to engage in
creative projects that further the new utility goals, including the growth of
energy efficiency and non-utility distributed resources.
The incentives created by cost-of-service ratemaking can work in oppo-
sition to goals for conservation and efficiency, and therefore need to be
carefully examined in a holistic fashion. Cost-of-service ratemaking must
also be supported by regulatory tools such as mandatory efficiency and re-
newable energy targets, long-term resource planning, and performance-
based incentives in order to ensure that traditional fossil-fuel generating
projects do not take the place of efficiency or decarbonized, distributed re-
sources. In addition, it is important to recognize that the utility’s market
power may have the negative effect of decreasing the ability of new market
players to enter the distributed resource space. For example, imagine that a
utility is able to build community solar projects that compete directly with
rooftop solar installations. The market power of the utility may make it
impossible for smaller providers to compete directly. Here, it is important
to openly and transparently balance competing goals and to establish priori-
ties. If the priority is to grow a non-utility distributed resource market, then
it may be important to protect nascent industries by restricting utility own-
ership of assets or providing subsidies to non-utility providers. However, it
must be acknowledged that this strategy may result in lower rates of decar-
bonization and/or higher rates for customers. Explicitly prioritizing goals
and forecasting the impact of policies in a transparent way should be a key
part of developing this aspect of any new regulatory structure.
Second: Changes to the Utility Value Proposition Must Address the Util-
ity’s Financial Stability.
While reimagining the utility as a service (non-commodity) provider or
a DSP holds promise as a means of transitioning to a distributed energy
future, any such changes will have to be undertaken carefully to ensure that
(1) an incentive for investment in the system remains; (2) investors are
rewarded for capital investments at a level commensurate with the risks;
and (3) new risks to investors do not drive up the cost of capital so far as to
be counterproductive to reform efforts. That is, if the cost-of-service model
is replaced with some other creative ratemaking structure, there must be
some alternative means of assurance to investors that the cost of mulit-
million or billion dollar projects will nonetheless be recovered through
rates. There must also be a way to reassure investors that utilities will re-
main a stable investment with reliable returns. If the utility becomes a risky
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investment, without a predictable structure for cost recovery and earnings,
investors will demand higher interest rates and therefore drive up costs to
customers.
Third: Disincentives to Efficiency and Conservation Should Be Replaced
with Incentives, Not Indifference.
Importantly, the existing cost-of-service model creates disincentives for
utilities to engage in conservation and efficiency, which are key to the de-
carbonization of the utility system. New regulatory incentives should be
designed to amplify utility investments in these areas and use the power of
incentives to increase energy efficiency, just as cost-of-service ratemaking
used the power of incentives to grow the utility system. Utilities could be
highly effective as aggregators for energy efficiency and distributed genera-
tion projects, particularly for projects that are currently not being com-
pleted by individuals. Utilities could be allowed to earn a return on
aggregated energy efficiency investments, or a performance incentive could
be tied to achievement of efficiency or distributed generation projects.
These options must be considered in any discussion of the utility of the
future.
Fourth: Regulatory Priorities Must Be Addressed Explicitly.
Changes in ratemaking and soft policy goals will not change established
regulatory priorities for low rates, reliability, and economic benefits to cur-
rent ratepayers. In order for utilities to effectively pursue decarbonization
and distributed generation, in most states new legislation will be needed to
explicitly prioritize these achievements above other goals, or to set hard
targets or specific milestones toward this end. Alternatively, legislation that
explicitly allows utility regulators to trade off lower rates in favor of new
distributed infrastructure or decarbonized resources, including energy effi-
ciency, would create a path toward the achievement of these key goals.
However, I would not suggest that regulation provide limitless discretion
for utility regulators. NY’s REV process, which leaves the PSC almost lim-
itless flexibility, is doubtless appealing to many who share the PSC’s vision,
but may be impossible to replicate outside the state. The same discretion
currently fueling extensive changes to New York’s regulatory future could
be used to shut down a similar process in a state with different laws, polit-
ics, and regulatory precedent. Instead, legislation should create specific pol-
icy goals and be explicit about the hierarchy of goals regulators should
pursue.
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Fifth: Changes to Ratemaking and Regulatory Incentives Cannot Be an
Afterthought.
Utilities and regulators alike recognize a need for systemic change to
address current market forces, including low growth, the rise of distributed
generation, and a desire for new services and increasing customer engage-
ment. But utilities cannot change the regulatory model, and as for-profit
entities, they can only be expected to act in their self-interest. It is unpro-
ductive to criticize utility management without putting a burden on regula-
tors and legislatures to provide a mechanism to change the existing
structure.
There is a great deal of interest right now in “the utility of the future,”
but to reach a new paradigm, we cannot ignore the utility of the present,
which is facing financial concerns due to low growth and new competition,
is undercapitalized in the areas of distribution and transmission infrastruc-
ture, and is seeking to offer new services to customers. We will not be able
to accomplish significant new goals for decarbonization and distributed gen-
eration without addressing the regulatory incentives that have been driving
the system for over a century.
